Volume 39
Issue 2 Spring
Spring 2009

Developing a State Constitutional Law Strategy in New Mexico
Criminal Prosecutions
J. Thomas Sullivan

Recommended Citation
J. Thomas Sullivan, Developing a State Constitutional Law Strategy in New Mexico Criminal Prosecutions,
39 N.M. L. Rev. 407 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol39/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

DEVELOPING A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STRATEGY IN NEW MEXICO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
ABSTRACT
This article includes a review of the process by which the New Mexico courts
have developed an independent state constitutional jurisprudence reflecting
more expansive protections of individual rights than those afforded by the
Federal Constitution, as interpreted in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. It addresses the existing body of state constitutional law and
suggests possibilities for further developments, including both the substantive
aspects of state constitutional topics and the procedural requirements for
asserting state constitutional protections as alternative sources for protection
of individual rights. It documents how far New Mexico has come in developing
a state constitutional jurisprudence reflecting the traditionally strong
independent approach taken by New Mexico in addressing the relationship
between the institution of government and its people.
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INTRODUCTION
The imaginative lawyer is still the fountainhead of our finest jurisprudence.1

Criminal defense lawyers are charged with the duty of protecting the rights of
their clients who face potential loss of liberty, and sometimes their lives, as a
consequence of being charged with criminal offenses.2 In the middle of the last
century, the United States Supreme Court undertook a major reform of the criminal
justice system by aggressively interpreting the criminal procedure guarantees
included in the Bill of Rights, and in selectively incorporating3 those guarantees to
afford those federal constitutional protections to state court defendants.4 It left intact

1. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 1985)
2. The New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct establish parameters for representation that serve to
inform criminal defense attorneys with regard to their duties to their clients. The fundamental rule is simple: “A
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Rule 16-101 NMRA. The rules
further provide that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Rule
16-103 NMRA.
With respect to the most critical concern for many criminal defendants—that they can trust counsel to
represent them aggressively despite their actual guilt—the Rules also address the thorny problem for laypersons:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be
established.
Rule 16-301 NMRA (emphasis added).
3. Significant judicial and scholarly comment has focused on the doctrine of “selective incorporation.”
See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteeenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Felix
Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965). For discussion of the “selective incorporation” doctrine in the Supreme
Court’s opinions, including the differing views, see, for example, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and
the separate opinions of Justices Frankfurter, id. at 59, 63–65 and Black, id. at 68, 71–90. The Adamson majority
concluded that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination did not apply to a California capital
prosecution. Id. at 54–55. Adamson was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying protection against double jeopardy to state
proceedings); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6 (applying Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in state
proceedings); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to require suppression in state court
prosecutions of physical evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment). The important rights secured by the
Sixth Amendment were made applicable in state proceedings in a series of important cases, including the right to
jury trial, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968), the right to speedy trial, see Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the right to confrontation, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the right to
compulsory process to obtain testimony and develop a defense, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and
the right to assistance of counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). More recently, the Court relied
on the right to notice in the accusation as a basis for requiring charging of factual allegations used for sentencing
enhancement in the charging instrument in state proceedings. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
The right to trial only upon an indictment returned by a grand jury was held not to apply to the states in Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
In 1971, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the death penalty in McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), in which the central claim had been that the
capital sentencing scheme failed to impose limits on the exercise of the sentencer’s discretion in setting punishment
at death. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion in his last term on the Court. A year later, a majority of the
Court reversed its position, voiding all existing state death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), and finding that the lack of effective standards or criteria for capital sentencing resulted in an
unconstitutional application of the death penalty. Thus, the Court incorporated the protections afforded by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment as an essential element of its death penalty
jurisprudence.
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the autonomy of state legislatures, for the most part, in defining criminal offenses
and recognizing theories of criminal defense under state law.5
The past quarter century, however, has seen a conservative shift in the posture
of the Supreme Court, resulting in a less expansive approach to federal
constitutional criminal procedure protections, although the Court has continued to
issue rulings favorable to the defense in a number of contexts.6 As concerns for
federalism have tended to prevail generally over development of individual rights,
the Court has carefully guarded its authority to interpret federal constitutional
protections. For example, in Oregon v. Hass,7 the Court rejected the Oregon
Supreme Court’s statement that it could “interpret the Fourth Amendment more
restrictively than interpreted by the United States Supreme Court” noting that this
statement was “not the law and surely must be an inadvertent error.”8 The Hass
Court further explained that while “a State is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards,” it “may not impose such greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically
refrains from imposing them.”9
As a more conservative Court began to restrict protections or impose limitations
on federal constitutional criminal procedures,10 state courts began to develop an
alternative jurisprudence based upon state, rather than federal, constitutional
protections. This movement was advanced by a seminal law review article written
by Justice William Brennan,11 and was reflected in a growing independence of state

5. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977).
6. Perhaps most significantly, the Court has continued to carefully review due process issues arising in the
context of state capital prosecutions, rendering decisions favorable to state capital defendants. See, e.g., House v.
Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 553–55 (2006) (holding newly discovered evidence cast sufficient doubt on integrity of
conviction and sentence to warrant review in federal habeas corpus); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
328–31 (2006) (reversing state rule limiting use of forensic evidence to develop evidence of alternative suspects
responsible for capital crime); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (execution of defendant under the age of
eighteen at the time of offense prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231 (2005) (holding prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges in capital prosecution demonstrated racial
discriminatory intent, despite contrary findings of state and lower federal courts); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S.
175 (2005) (remanding for reconsideration of propriety of death sentence where prosecutor used inconsistent
theories in pursuing death penalty against co-defendants); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to examine file on defendant’s prior conviction admitted at capital
sentencing hearing); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632–35 (2005) (shackling of defendant during capital
sentencing hearing improper).
7. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
8. Id. at 719 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1208
(1974)).
9. Id. at 719 (emphasis in original).
10. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)
(recognizing a “good faith” exception to warrant requirement where warrant defective due to clerical or other error
made inadvertently). The New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently rejected Leon in State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M.
431, 432, 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1993), interpreting article II, section 10 of the New Mexico constitution as
precluding the “good-faith” exception applied by the U.S. Supreme Court. For additional comment, see Shannon
Oliver, Refusing to “Turn the Other Cheek”—New Mexico Rejects Federal “Good Faith” Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: State v. Gutierrez, 24 N.M. L. REV. 545 (1994).
11. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 501 (1977) (noting that determinations relying on state constitutional law are beyond the reach of federal
review). The practical approach to using these alternative sources of law is examined in Robert F. Utter & Sanford
E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635
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appellate courts, including the New Mexico Supreme Court.12 Justice Brennan
observed:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must
not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.13

Because New Mexico has clearly asserted its independent role in evaluating state
constitutional protections applicable in criminal prosecutions, prosecutors and
defense lawyers practicing in state courts must be aware of appellate decisions
relying on state constitutional interpretation and application bearing on issues raised
in individual cases. Defense counsel, as well, must approach issues not already
protected under state law with a creative eye toward anticipating directions in which
the New Mexico Supreme Court may be persuaded to move and toward preservation
of state constitutional and legal claims14 that may benefit their clients.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN
NEW MEXICO
The New Mexico Supreme Court began articulating a constitutional criminal
procedure jurisprudence based on its interpretation of protections afforded under
the state constitution as early as 1976, virtually contemporaneous with the
emergence of this approach in other jurisdictions.15 The court announced, in State

(1987). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
557 (1940))).
12. For an enlightening judicial perspective on the historical development of New Mexico constitutional
law as an alternative source of protection of individual rights in criminal prosecutions, see Justice Franchini’s
opinion for the majority in State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225, and Justice Baca’s
concurring opinion, id. ¶ 25, 25 P.3d at 234. The case involved the question of whether federal agents were bound
to observe state law in detaining and searching individuals at the border with Mexico leading to arrest and
prosecution in New Mexico state courts. See also Rebecca N. Turner, Note, Search and Seizure Law: State v.
Cardenas-Alvarez: The Jurisdictional Reach of State Constitutions—Applying State Search and Seizure Standards
to Federal Agents, 32 N.M. L. REV. 531 (2002).
13. Brennan, supra note 11, at 491.
14. State law-based claims may not only be predicated on state constitutional protections, but on state law
or procedural rules, as well, although state courts are not bound to apply federal precedent in terms of remedies.
Thus, in Virginia v. Moore, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1606–08 (2008), the Court held that where searches violate personal
privacy interests protected under state law, but not by the Fourth Amendment, suppression of improperly seized
evidence—the remedy applied to Fourth Amendment violations as a matter of federal law, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655–58 (1961)—was not constitutionally required. States may require suppression of illegally seized
evidence, but are compelled to do so only where the violation is based on a privacy interest recognized and
protected under the Fourth Amendment. However, in State v. Snyder, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule applies in a state court prosecution to evidence seized by federal border agents, who were
found to be in violation of the state constitution. 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 1, 967 P.2d 843, 844 (“Based on the
independent grounds provided by our state constitution, we determine that the exclusionary rule under Article II,
Section 10 applies to the use of evidence in a New Mexico state court proceeding when that evidence resulted from
a search conducted by federal border-patrol agents at a checkpoint in New Mexico.”); accord State v. Wagoner,
2001-NMCA-014, ¶ 29, 24 P.3d 306, 314.
15. For scholarly analysis of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s development of an independent state
constitutional jurisprudence, see Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation over New
Mexico’s State Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L. REV. 387 (1998); Jennifer C. Juste, Constitutional
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ex rel. Serna v. Hodges,16 that it was rejecting the so-called “lock-step” approach
to constitutional interpretation in which state constitutional protections were simply
held to have the same scope as analogous federal provisions as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. The court explained, “We are not bound to give the
same meaning to the New Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme Court
places upon the United States Constitution, even in construing provisions having
wording that is identical, or substantially so.…”17 It had recognized that the state
constitution might provide a more expansive protection than analogous federal
provisions earlier in State v. Deltenre.18 There, the court observed that an arrest
must comport not only with federal constitutional requirements, but also standards
imposed under state law, while declining to find that the arrest violated New
Mexico law.19
A. Recognition and Application of State Constitutional Protections
A significant break with the dominance of federal constitutional jurisprudence
in matters of criminal procedure came with the 1989 decision in State v. Cordova,20
when the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to follow the United States Supreme
Court’s lead in replacing the Aguilar/Spinelli21 test for determining the sufficiency
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant in favor of the totality of
circumstances test announced in Illinois v. Gates.22 The Aguilar/Spinelli test
focused the magistrate’s attention on two specific issues: (1) the credibility of the
informer supplying information to police seeking the warrant,23 and (2)
corroboration of the information disclosed24 as the necessary elements of the test for
probable cause. In Gates, the Court permitted the magistrate to consider the entirety
of the circumstances in considering whether to issue the warrant.25 The warrant in
Gates was issued on the basis of a corroborated tip provided by an anonymous
informant.26

Law—The Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New Mexico’s Civil and Criminal Procedure—State
v. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REV. 355 (1998); Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State Constitutional Law Comes of Age,
28 N.M. L. REV. 379 (1998); and Gene E. Franchini, New Mexico Independent Adjudication, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1495
(1998).
16. 89 N.M. 351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553
P.2d 688 (1976).
17. Id. at 356, 552 P.2d at 792; accord State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 782, 932 P.2d 618, 662 (1997)
(“[A]s the ultimate arbiters of the law of New Mexico[,][w]e are not bound to give the same meaning to the New
Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme Court places upon the United States Constitution.…”).
18. 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), overruled on other grounds by State v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 439,
612 P.2d 228, 231 (1980).
19. Id. at 503–04, 424 P.2d at 786.
20. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
21. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). These cases were
abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
22. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
23. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
24. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16.
25. 462 U.S. at 230–31, 238–39.
26. Id. at 225–26. The Court observed that the tip alone was likely insufficient to establish probable cause.
Id. at 227. However, it noted that the supporting affidavit, which confirmed one of the factual assertions in the
anonymous tip, would have tended to corroborate the information provided by the anonymous informant. Id. at
227–28. In reversing the state supreme court, the Gates majority concluded that the information was sufficient to
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In rejecting Gates in Cordova,27 New Mexico joined other states28 in maintaining
a preference for the two-pronged Aguilar/Spinelli test as that to be applied as a
matter of state constitutional law.29 Yet, although the court expressly held that it
was deciding the case based on application of the state constitution,30 the
Aguilar/Spinelli test was derived not from an independent reading of the protection
afforded by article II, section 10 of the New Mexico constitution, but from prior
decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the warrant requirement
contained in the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that
Aguilar/Spinelli had essentially been adopted by New Mexico courts and correctly
expressed the state’s experience and practice.31
B. Adoption of the “Interstitial Approach” to Construction of State
Constitutional Protections
Some eight years following its decision in Cordova, the New Mexico Supreme
Court would explain its view in developing an organized body of state constitutional
jurisprudence in State v. Gomez.32 The court adopted the “interstitial approach” to
the articulation of state law-based rights. New Mexico’s “interstitial approach”
recognizes that state constitutional protections may be interpreted more broadly
than their federal constitutional counterparts in certain circumstances, “diverg[ing]
from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural
differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics.”33 The departure does not require a finding of all three grounds set
forth in Gomez; any one of the three will support the appellate court’s evaluation
of the argument for more expansive protection under state law than that available
under federal law.34
In adopting this approach, New Mexico again rejected the “lock-step” alternative
in which state constitutional guarantees are construed as co-extensive with

establish probable cause for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 245–46. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that
information supporting the warrant would not even satisfy the totality of circumstances test adopted by the
majority. Id. at 291, 293–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also dissenting,
agreed with Justice Stevens’s assessment of the inadequacy of the information supporting the warrant. Id. at 274
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989).
28. Id.; accord State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985); State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985), on remand from Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727
(1984); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989); State
v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984); see also Neil Colman McCabe, Criminal Law Developments Under State
Constitutions, 1989–1990, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1, 10 (1990) (discussing rejection of Gates by
Tennessee and New Mexico courts).
29. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36 (“We conclude that our present court rules better effectuate
the principles behind Article II, Section 10 of our Constitution than does the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test set
out in Gates.”).
30. Id. at 212 n.1, 784 P.2d at 31.
31. Id. at 215–16, 784 P.2d at 36–37 (citing SCRA 5-211(E), now Rule 5-211(E) NMRA).
32. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19–20, 932 P.2d 1, 7.
33. Id. ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
34. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 14, 25 P.3d 225, 230–31 (“We do not find flaw
in the federal analysis, nor do we detect structural differences between state and federal government that warrant
departure from federal precedent. Our examination of New Mexico law, however, does reveal distinctive
characteristics that command our departure from federal law governing border checkpoint detentions.”).
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comparable federal constitutional protections.35 Once the court determines that the
Federal Constitution, as interpreted or applied by the Supreme Court, does not
afford the accused the protection claimed, it then proceeds to consider whether the
preserved state law claim merits relief on the alternative, state law basis.36
1. The Requirement for Preservation of State Constitutional Claims by Trial
Objection
The Gomez court also held that preservation of the state constitutional claim was
sufficient if the state constitutional provision relied upon is expressly raised by the
litigant.37 However, the preservation requirement imposed by the Gomez court
requires not only that trial counsel expressly claim reliance on a state constitutional
protection when the state claim has not been previously addressed, but “also must
assert in the trial court that the state constitutional provision at issue should be
interpreted more expansively than the federal counterpart and provide reasons for
interpreting the state provision differently from the federal provision.”38 The
rationale for this preservation requirement may not be altogether clear with regard
to every claim because the interpretation of the New Mexico constitution would
appear to be primarily the function of the state’s appellate courts.39
However, some claims are not dependent upon factual analysis, and presumably,
the appellate court could proceed to review the state constitutional theory asserted
by trial counsel without regard to the specific factual context in which the claim
arises, just as the appellate court might review a legal claim de novo because factual
findings made by the trial court are extraneous to the issue.40 Additionally, the court

35. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 16, 932 P.2d at 6.
36. An alternative approach, labeled the “primacy approach,” requires the state court to initially determine
if state law affords the protection claimed by the defendant. If it does, the court does not need to consider the
analogous federal protection. If state law does not afford the protection, the state court then looks to federal
protection to decide the claim on the merits of the federal constitutional issue raised. Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 932 P.2d at 7
(citing Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1170 (1985), and noting other jurisdictions adopting the “primacy approach,” e.g., State
v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778 (Me. 1984); State v. Chaisson, 486 A.2d 297 (N.H. 1984); State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d 1220
(Or. 1984); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984)). Of course, only if the defendant does not plead reliance
on federal constitutional protections would a state court be free not to proceed by considering the applicability of
federal law. But, presumably, under this approach, a defendant offering only a generalized constitutional claim,
not invoking federal protections, might fail to preserve a federal constitutional claim. E.g., Hinkston v. State, 10
S.W.3d 906, 909 (Ark. 2000) (where trial court excluded mental state evidence arguably admissible under state
law, failure to additionally assert violation of Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause resulted in state
supreme court refusing to consider federal constitutional claim on the merits on appeal).
37. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 22, 932 P.2d at 8 (“[T]he claim may be preserved by (1) asserting the
constitutional principle that provides the protection sought under the New Mexico Constitution, and (2) showing
the factual basis needed for the trial court to rule on the issue.”).
38. Id. ¶ 23, 932 P.2d at 8 (emphasis omitted).
39. Both the New Mexico Supreme Court and New Mexico Court of Appeals have been actively involved
in interpreting the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, 142 P.3d 933 (holding that
state charter protects an individual’s privacy interest in his garbage, contrary to California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 37 (1988)). But, in Granville, the state constitutional law question was initially decided by the trial court in
the accused’s favor. Id. ¶ 16, 142 P.3d at 938.
40. E.g., State v. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d 647, 648 (“Because this case presents only the
pure legal question of whether the New Mexico Constitution permits arrests for minor offenses that cannot result
in jail time, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.”).
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recognized that appellate counsel often function in a somewhat superior position to
develop the proper analysis supporting a new claim, observing:
The rule announced today is also a recognition of realities separating trial and
appellate practice. Although we expect trial counsel to be well-advised of state
constitutional law on a particular subject affecting his or her client’s interests,
we also recognize that the arguments a trial lawyer reasonably can be expected
to articulate on an issue arising in the heat of trial are far different from what an
appellate lawyer may develop after reflection, research, and substantial briefing.
It is impractical to require trial counsel to develop the arguments, articulate
rationale, and cite authorities that may appear in an appellate brief. Here, the
record establishes unambiguously that Gomez invoked a principle recognized
under the New Mexico Constitution, the facts needed for a ruling on exigent
circumstances were developed, and the trial court made a ruling on exigent
circumstances. Therefore, the issue was preserved.41

Nevertheless, the state’s appellate courts have yet to modify or recognize exceptions
to the preservation rules, as articulated.
Thus, the Gomez court explained that the accused’s theory must be presented to
enable the trial court to “tailor proceedings and to effectuate an appropriate ruling
on the issue.”42 If, in fact, a New Mexico trial court does fashion a ruling predicated
on interpretation of the state constitution and the accused is acquitted, the State
might effectively be prejudiced by its inability to challenge the trial court’s
determination by appeal that would reinstate the prosecution.43 But, that
consideration aside, the need for development of the factual basis on which the
claim is predicated underlies the logic in the preservation requirement.44
Moreover, the requirement for preservation of the state constitutional or lawbased claim of greater protection of an individual right than that afforded by the
Federal Constitution is peculiarly a matter within the discretion of the state’s courts.
In State v. Muñoz, for instance, the court of appeals rejected the argument that the
preservation requirement for these claims violated equal protection because litigants
not relying on state constitutional or law-based claims are permitted to raise their
claims as matters of fundamental error on appeal45 when they have not been
properly preserved by trial objection.46
41. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 31, 932 P.2d at 10.
42. Id. ¶ 23, 932 P.2d at 8.
43. Even a legally improper basis for acquittal would bar retrial as a matter of federal constitutional double
jeopardy protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. An acquittal terminates jeopardy on the charges tried. An
acquittal occurs whenever a jury returns a verdict of acquittal, see Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467
(2005), a trial is terminated because of lack of evidence, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564 (1977) (court ordered acquittal after jury unable to reach verdict), or a conviction is reversed on appeal as a
result of insufficient evidence, see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19
(1978). Reversal for trial error does not bar retrial. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15; United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
465–66 (1964).
44. Rule 12-216(A) NMRA; see also Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 14, 932 P.2d at 6 (“In Fullen v. Fullen,
21 N.M. 212, 153 P. 294 (1915), this Court surveyed appellate preservation rules of other jurisdictions and noted
that ‘[i]t is a fundamental rule of appellate practice and procedure that an appellate court will consider only such
questions as were raised in the lower court.’”).
45. Rule 12-216(B)(2) NMRA.
46. State v. Muñoz, 2008-NMCA-090, ¶¶ 28–30, 187 P.3d 696, 704–05, cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT006, 188 P.3d 105 (Table, No. 31,151).
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While disclaiming that it intended to require litigants to preserve their state
constitutional claims in strict compliance with criteria by which those claims may
afford relief when comparable federal protections would not, the Gomez court
nonetheless suggested criteria advanced in other jurisdictions, affording direction
to New Mexico litigants.47 These criteria remain influential in providing trial
attorneys with grounds for more expansive protections afforded by the state
constitution than those articulated by the Supreme Court in construing comparable
provisions of the Federal Constitution. The criteria and their use in New Mexico
cases will be discussed in Part III of this article.
2. Application of the Fundamental Error Doctrine
While explaining the preservation requirement for state constitutional claims in
some detail, the Gomez court also, inexplicably, interjected the fundamental error
concept into the discussion. The court noted that the issue raised by Gomez involved
a search and seizure claim implicating privacy interests under the state constitution,
observing: “Even if Gomez’s contentions before the trial court had failed to
preserve the state constitutional claim, we could nevertheless consider it because
freedom from illegal search and seizure is a fundamental right.”48 The problem is
that in suggesting that state constitutional claims may be the subject of fundamental
error analysis, the Gomez court implicitly undercut its own demand that trial
counsel preserve error by proper objection and, when a novel interpretation is
required, supply a theoretical basis for the interpretation sought.
In State v. Barber,49 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that in order for a
claim to qualify for review as a matter of fundamental error, it:
must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which
was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to
waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits.
Out of the facts in each case will arise the law.50

The Barber court offered a lengthy historical analysis of the concept of fundamental
error in New Mexico, noting that while actual innocence may be a controlling factor
in the determination that error should be evaluated as fundamental, not all
cognizable fundamental error claims do arise in the context of disputed guilt.51 The
court observed that the second strand of fundamental error doctrine focuses more
on process and the integrity of the adversarial system.
Since claims asserting New Mexico constitutional grounds will almost
necessarily implicate fundamental protections, the Gomez court’s reference to the
applicability of fundamental error review to claims arising under the state
constitution would appear to open the door to appellate review of these claims
irrespective of compliance with preservation requirements also set out in Gomez.
However, the post-Gomez history of the appellate courts’ treatment of unpreserved
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23 n.3, 932 P.2d at 8.
Id. ¶ 31 n.4, 932 P.2d at 10 (emphasis added).
2004-NMSC-019, 92 P.3d 633.
Id. ¶ 8, 92 P.3d at 636 (citing State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 309, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942)).
Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.
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claims of state constitutional protections suggests nothing less than that trial
counsel’s failure to preserve a state law basis for protection of the client’s rights
will result in waiver of the issue on appeal. The inconsistency in the signals sent is
compounded by rejection of fundamental error claims predicated on state
constitutional protections.52
An example of the operation of the preservation requirement in the context of
fundamental rights is presented in State v. Silva.53 The issue involved a question of
fundamental rights secured by the Federal Constitution. The state supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, which had itself reversed the appellant’s conviction
based on a fundamental error claim. The court of appeals found that the trial court
erred in depriving trial counsel of an opportunity to impeach a witness on crossexamination with the fact that the prosecution had promised not to prosecute him
in return for his testimony.54 Both courts concluded that the objection was not
properly preserved at trial because counsel failed to assert the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment claim, having only raised the witness’s Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate himself during questioning at his deposition.55 While the supreme court
agreed that the trial court had erred,56 it rejected the relief afforded by the court of
appeals because even an error affecting a fundamental right does not necessarily
result in relief.57 The Silva court explained:
[W]e will use the doctrine to reverse a conviction only “if the defendant’s guilt
is so questionable that upholding a conviction would shock the conscience, or
where, notwithstanding the apparent culpability of the defendant, substantial
justice has not been served. Substantial justice has not been served when a
fundamental unfairness within the system has undermined judicial integrity.”58

The supreme court then noted that two different factors could require relief once
there is a finding of error resulting in the violation of a fundamental right. First,
evidence conclusively demonstrating the accused’s actual innocence warrants
relief.59 Alternatively, even if the defendant’s innocence is not established in the
record, relief is warranted when the error results in unfairness undermining the
credibility of the justice system.60
In Silva, the preservation problem was created because trial counsel had phrased
his objection in terms of the Fifth Amendment rights of the witness, rather than the
Sixth Amendment confrontation right afforded the accused. Because counsel did not
52. See State v. Garcia, 2008-NMCA-044, ¶ 10, 182 P.3d 146, 149–50 rev’d, 2009-NMSC-046, available
at http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2009/09sc-046.pdf; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶ 8, 166
P.3d 1106, 1109–10.
53. 2008-NMSC-051, 192 P.3d 1192, affirming in part and reversing in part, 2007-NMCA-117, 168 P.3d
1110.
54. Id. ¶ 9, 192 P.3d at 1194–95.
55. Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 192 P.3d at 1194–95.
56. Id. ¶ 12, 192 P.3d at 1195. The trial court prevented defense counsel from cross-examining the witness
with respect to whether the State had offered him anything in return for his testimony.
57. Id. ¶ 13, 192 P.3d at 1196.
58. Id. (citing Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 846, 849).
59. Id. ¶ 14, 192 P.3d at 1196 (citing State v. Garcia, 19 N.M. 414, 422, 143 P. 1012, 1015 (1914)
(reversing where evidence showed defendant unconscious at the time of the offense and, therefore, indisputably
innocent)).
60. Id. ¶ 14, 192 P.3d at 1196.
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explicitly rely on the Sixth Amendment, the error was not preserved at trial for
review on appeal. Thus, even though violation of a fundamental right was
implicated by the trial court’s limitation on cross-examination in Silva, trial
counsel’s failure to preserve error in terms of phrasing the objection as a Sixth
Amendment confrontation violation was critical in depriving the defendant of
reliance on the favorable harmless error standard of Chapman v. California for
review of federal constitutional claims generally.61
Moreover, because the Silva court found that the trial court had permitted
extensive cross-examination and impeachment of the witness, characterizing the
cross as “practically devastating the witness,” it concluded that fundamental error
did not occur at trial.62 The extent of cross permitted and the success of the crossexamination were sufficient to rebut the argument that the trial court’s error in
limiting trial counsel’s questioning did not demonstrate fundamental error
warranting relief in the absence of a timely and correct objection.63 The supreme
court’s conclusion that fundamental error had not occurred was, in fact, consistent
with the formula applied by the United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall64 for assessing when a limitation upon cross-examination—as opposed to
a denial of cross examination—results in a violation of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment.65
In State v. Garcia, the appellant argued that the application of differing standards
with regard to preservation of claims based on state constitutional protections
violates equal protection in discriminating against those defendants who did not
fully preserve their state constitutional claims by offering a rationale at trial as to
why state law affords broader relief than federal constitutional protections.66 The
underlying facts suggested an interesting claim raising the applicability of the
Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Hodari D., in which the Court rejected
an illegal seizure claim where the defendant ran when he saw officers and then
dropped crack cocaine while they were chasing him.67 The Hodari D. Court found
that because the defendant escaped from a momentary interference with his liberty

61. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that the burden of proving that constitutional error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt is placed upon the beneficiary of the error).
62. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 192 P.3d at 1196.
63. Id.
64. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
65. In evaluating a confrontation claim based on limitation on cross, the Van Arsdall Court set forth the
following test employed by the reviewing court:
The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination
were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host
of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the
witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution’s case.
Id. at 684. The reviewing court then conducts a harmless error analysis, in light of the factors identified by the
Court as bearing on the issue of prejudice. Id. at 684 (remanding to state court for harmless error analysis).
66. State v. Garcia, 2008-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 29–32, 182 P.3d 146, 153–54, rev’d, 2009-NMSC-046, available
at http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2009/09sc-046.pdf.
67. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622–23 (1991).
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and did not actually submit to the show of authority by police, he had not been
seized at the time he fled and dropped the contraband, thus abandoning it.68
The state court of appeals applied Hodari D. in State v. Rector,69 where the
defendant had dropped the contraband before either being physically restrained by
officers or otherwise submitting to their show of authority. Garcia attempted to
distinguish his case from Hodari D. and Rector, arguing that he had been restrained
when an officer pepper-sprayed him after his repeated refusals to stop at the
command of police.70 The Garcia court concluded that because he had not
submitted to authority before disposing of the cocaine, he could not show that he
had been deprived of his liberty by virtue of acquiescence to the officer’s order for
him to stop.71 It then rejected his argument that being pepper-sprayed amounted to
a physical restraint under Hodari D.72 Instead, the court held that Garcia was not
restrained or in physical custody when he threw the contraband away, abandoning
the cocaine.73
The court of appeals also addressed the argument in Garcia that greater
protection is afforded to New Mexico defendants under the state constitution than
that provided by the Fourth Amendment, first noting that this issue had specifically
been left open in prior cases.74 But the court expressly declined to address the claim
on the merits, holding that the claim had not been properly preserved in the trial
court for appellate review.75 The court of appeals, however, did address the merits
of Garcia’s claim, argued on appeal, that the application of the preservation
requirement to claimed violations of the state constitution, rather than permitting
such claims to be advanced as fundamental error in the absence of preservation,
constituted an equal protection violation. The court found the argument to be
“inherently flawed.”76
The court of appeals also reasoned that there was no discrimination against those
litigants who failed to preserve their state constitutional claims properly at trial.
Instead, it found that the application of the preservation rule simply differentiated
between those litigants complying with the preservation requirement dictated by the
supreme court, and those who failed to comply, explaining, “Defendant cannot
demonstrate that the preservation requirement discussed in Gomez draws a
classification that discriminates against his class in the exercise of his appellate
rights. Defendant was treated differently due to his failure to follow established
rules of appellate procedure.”77
The intermediate court’s rationale was likely correct in terms of the precise
question it addressed, but there are additional considerations that suggest that the

68. Id. at 627–29.
69. 2005-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 6–8, 105 P.3d 341, 342–43.
70. Garcia, 2008-NMCA-044, ¶ 8, 182 P.3d at 149.
71. Id. ¶ 17, 182 P.3d at 151.
72. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20–25, 182 P.3d at 151–53.
73. Id. ¶ 28, 182 P.3d at 153.
74. Id. ¶ 9, 182 P.3d at 149 (citing State v. Harbison, 2007-NMSC-016, ¶ 16 n.3, 156 P.3d 30, 35; Rector,
2005-NMCA-014, ¶ 5, 105 P.3d 341, 342).
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶ 30, 182 P.3d at 154.
77. Id. ¶ 31, 182 P.3d at 154.
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strict compliance with the preservation requirement might ultimately be
reconsidered. However, in reviewing the case on writ of certiorari, the New Mexico
Supreme Court reconsidered the preservation question, holding that the strict
requirement for defendants to develop their theories for expanded protection under
the state constitution did not apply on the facts of the case.78 Instead, the court
observed that the state constitutional claim had been argued in response to the
disposition by the court of appeals, which had held that Garcia had not been seized
and thus, that his suppression argument failed under Hodari D.79 Finding that the
state constitutional issue regarding the nature of the seizure itself had not become
contested until the case was argued in the court of appeals, Justice Serna concluded
for the court that the requirement that the defendant fully develop his state
constitutional claim before the trial court did not bar the consideration of his
argument on appeal:80 “Defendant’s state constitutional claim was a response to the
State’s argument for affirmance on what amounted to right-for-any-reason
grounds.”81
On the merits, the Garcia court rejected Hodari D.’s more rigid view of the
seizure requirement in favor of the traditional analysis articulated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Mendenhall.82 The Mendenhall approach focused on
whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would share the suspect’s
perception that he was under arrest because he was not “free to leave” the scene
when confronted by an officer.83 In rejecting Hodari D.’s less-protective test, the
court noted substantial criticism by other state courts that had similarly refused to
abandon the Mendenhall standard.84 The court ultimately reversed the lower courts
and ordered the evidence suppressed, relying on state constitutional principles.85
The relaxation of the preservation rule in Garcia suggests that the state supreme
court could well alter the preservation requirement in light of its experience in
developing state constitutional law since Gomez. Justice Bosson, in his special
concurrence, for instance, offered to initiate a full discussion of the preservation
requirement for state constitutional law claims: “I write separately to stimulate
(hopefully) a dialogue regarding what we reasonably should continue to demand
today—over twelve years after Gomez—to preserve a search and seizure argument
under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.”86 He argued that
because Garcia’s counsel had moved to suppress the evidence and expressly relied
on article II, section 10 the existing expanded view of the privacy protection
recognized by the state courts provided sufficient notice of his reliance on this body
of law to preserve the issue for appellate review.87
78. State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, available at http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2009/
09sc-046.pdf.
79. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
80. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶¶ 10–12.
81. Id. ¶ 12.
82. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
83. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that an individual is seized “only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”).
84. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 33.
85. Id. ¶ 47.
86. Id. ¶ 50 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
87. Id. ¶ 53.
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There is reason for altering the preservation requirement with regard to certain
state constitutional law claims.88 In Garcia, for instance, trial counsel stated its
reliance on the alternative state constitutional provision, but failed to complete the
preservation requirement by advancing an argument as to why the state constitution
affords broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.89 Consequently, the courts
were, at the least, on notice that counsel intended reliance on the state constitution,
and the facts were sufficiently developed so that both the trial and appellate courts
could make that determination without regard to any supporting policy argument,
a view consistent with Justice Bosson’s Garcia concurrence. Therefore, in Garcia
at least, the additional obligation to preserve error by advancing the policy argument
does not really suggest a rational basis for not addressing Garcia’s state
constitutional argument on the merits. This is particularly true in light of the fact
that the courts had already been apprised of the limitations of Hodari D. and
possible alternative remedy under the state constitution in Rector.
On the other hand, the equal protection argument might be framed differently,
although perhaps only in the context of a future case. The question would be why
litigants advancing state constitutional law claims are denied the benefit of
fundamental error review while those asserting federal constitutional claims or nonconstitutional state law claims may rely on the fundamental error doctrine on appeal
when trial counsel has failed to preserve error at all. If, in fact, the issue otherwise
warrants review because it implicates a fundamental right protected by the New
Mexico Constitution and denial of the right has compromised justice, such as by
contributing to the conviction of an innocent accused or undermining the credibility
of the process, then arguably, restriction of the accused’s right to claim fundamental
error as a matter of protections afforded by the state constitution would appear
unjustified.90
But, in response, one might consider the nature of appellate review of
unpreserved claims of error generally. Some claims warrant review precisely
because the settled law dictates reversal to avoid prejudice. This is essentially the
test for “plain error,” as discussed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano91
in applying Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.92 There the
Court held that unpreserved error could warrant review and reversal despite the
failure to timely object if the appellant can show that there was a deviation from
normal procedure constituting an “error” in the trial court; that the error was

88. Justice Bosson’s reasoning is rather compelling:
We cannot allow the development of our state Constitution to be retarded by overly burdensome,
hyper-technical, and impractical preservation requirements. As New Mexico’s highest court, it
is our duty and privilege to interpret and develop the New Mexico Constitution. In a government
of dual sovereigns, it is imperative that our state Constitution develop to its full potential and
protect the rights of our citizens where we deem federal law lacking.
Id. ¶ 57.
89. Id. ¶ 7(majority opinion); id. ¶¶ 52–53 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
90. State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 14, 192 P.3d 1192, 1196.
91. 507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993).
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”). Similarly, Rule 103(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, in
the context of admission or exclusion of evidence at trial: “Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
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“plain,” or “obvious”; and that the error “affects substantial rights,” meaning that
it was prejudicial in most instances, affecting the outcome of the proceedings in the
trial court.93 Using this analysis, review of “plain error” does not contemplate
recognition of newly defined rights at all, precisely because that recognition is
contrary to the notion that the error is obvious or clear.
Of course, fundamental error analysis can also apply to recognition of new rights
or applications of existing rights. The Olano Court’s explanation of the fundamental
error review in federal proceedings as limited to “plain error” is not controlling on
state law or the interpretation of a state court’s authority to review for fundamental
error. In fact, the New Mexico standard for determination of fundamental error, as
articulated in State v. Barber,94 would seemingly provide a far more creative, or
expansive, view of the authority of the state courts for considering unpreserved
claims of error that compromise the integrity of the criminal process or undermine
confidence in the accuracy or fairness of the conviction.
The supreme court’s disposition of the claims raised in Garcia may ultimately
reshape New Mexico’s approach to the development of state constitutional law in
recognizing a more liberal preservation policy. Or, it may well leave intact the
preservation requirement that has controlled appellate review since its articulation
in Gomez.95 Nevertheless, the decisions in Garcia and Silva demonstrate the
difficulty in relying on fundamental error in raising novel claims of constitutional
error. Presumably, because the contours of established federal constitutional
doctrine are already well-defined, reviewing courts are fully capable of assessing
the claims on the merits based on the record of trial. But reliance on fundamental
error asserted on appeal advancing state constitutional error claims is likely to be
even more difficult, in part, because appellate counsel will often be asking the
reviewing court to speculate on the nature of the claim based on what may be an
underdeveloped factual record.
3. Concomitant Preservation of Federal and State Claims in the Absence of
Federal Precedent
A final comment on the “interstitial approach” is worth noting. Counsel arguing
for a more expansive protection of individual rights, whether under the New Mexico
Constitution or other state law, should bear in mind that the interstitial approach
contemplates at least two different scenarios. First, counsel may look to state law
because the Federal Constitution has already been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court not to afford protections for the defendant on the facts raised by the
case.96 In this situation, counsel seeks a more expansive protection under state law
93. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–34.
94. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
95. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 22–23, 932 P.2d at 8.
96. See, e.g., Campos v. State, 870 P.2d 117, 120–21 (1994) (interpreting article II, section 10 of the New
Mexico constitution to require that a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause and exigent circumstances,
contrary to United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423, (1976)). Another example of this situation is presented
by the litigation in Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001), in which the United States Supreme Court
summarily reversed the state supreme court’s holding in State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000), that
a pretextual arrest and search were prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, “flatly contrary” to the Court’s prior
decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). On remand, the Arkansas court again upheld suppression
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than that which would apply if the New Mexico courts were to consider the
construction of federal constitutional guarantees adequate to fully protect the rights
claimed in the individual prosecution.97
Alternatively, counsel may be asking the state courts to interpret state law with
respect to a specific claim upon which there exists no federal constitutional
precedent at all, or none that is directly applicable.98 For example, in State v.
Sarracino,99 the court rejected the defendant’s argument that New Mexico law
afforded greater due process protection for state court defendants than the
Fourteenth Amendment, while holding that the state constitutional claim had been
preserved by the tendering of a proposed jury instruction cautioning jurors of the
potential unreliability of testimony offered by an accomplice. Yet, the court
observed that Sarracino could point to no federal constitutional authority on point
warranting comparative review. Instead, the court observed:
[T]he federal practice on which Sarracino relied for his proposed instruction is
founded in rules of procedure rather than constitutional doctrine. As a result,
there is not an existing federal constitutional scheme from which Sarracino could
urge that this Court, or the district court, depart. Instead, we believe that, by
tendering his proposed instruction, Sarracino preserved the question whether
New Mexico’s jury instructions adequately respond to the concerns
accompanying accomplice testimony, or whether New Mexico’s existing practice
should be changed. In our own review of this question, we deem it necessary to
resort to constitutional principles.100

Thus, state law may provide protections that have not been addressed in federal
constitutional litigation, or that may pre-date consideration of comparable claims.
For example, well before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v.
Kentucky,101 the New Mexico court recognized in State v. Crespin102 that, under
article II, section 4 of the New Mexico constitution, the exclusion of a substantial
number of minority jurors in a single case could raise the inference of systematic
exclusion by the prosecutor. In Batson, the Court held that the difficulties in proving
a violation of the rights of prospective jurors under Swain v. Alabama,103 which
required proof of systematic exclusion of minority jurors based on evidence relating
of the evidence, this time on state constitutional grounds. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Ark. 2002).
97. An example of the state court’s consideration of the effect of New Mexico statutory law may be seen
in State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, 33 P.3d 1, where the court concluded that provisions of section 32A-2-14
of the New Mexico Statutes, relating to the rights of juvenile offenders subject to questioning, are not intended to
merely incorporate or reflect the federal constitutional principle set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 32, 33 P.3d at 14.
98. Even if there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, however, that does not necessarily end the inquiry
because lower federal court precedent may inform the state appellate courts and provide a basis for distinguishing
federal and state protections. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 7–10, 25 P.3d 225, 228–30
(comparing the New Mexico standard of “reasonable suspicion” to justify extended detention following traffic stop
with the federal standard, applied by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889
(10th Cir. 1993), of mere “suspicious circumstances” for extended border stop, and holding that state law affords
more protection than Federal Constitution under circumstances).
99. 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 11, 964 P.2d 72, 76–77.
100. Id. ¶ 11, 964 P.2d at 77.
101. 476 U.S. 89 (1986).
102. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
103. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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to a number of trials in a jurisdiction,104 were simply too difficult to meet.105 Thus,
Crespin articulated a state constitutional basis for a more expansive protection
afforded state court defendants than that afforded under Swain,106 at least until the
Court modified the process for demonstrating an impermissible use of peremptory
challenges in Batson.
Similarly, a more expansive protection for individual rights under state law may
arise from legislative action, rather than from judicial decisions construing the state
constitution. Two years after the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the
execution of mentally retarded inmates in Penry v. Lynaugh,107 the New Mexico
legislature enacted a statutory prohibition on execution of mentally retarded capital
defendants,108 providing a protection not available under the Eighth Amendment
until the decision in Penry was abrogated in Atkins v. Virginia.109
But, trial counsel should also be aware of the need to assert federal constitutional
grounds at trial in addition to arguing state constitutional protection when there is
no existing Supreme Court precedent dictating the disposition of the issue as a
matter of federal constitutional law. The reason is two-fold. First, it is not entirely
unlikely that where the appropriate federal constitutional protection has not been
interpreted or applied with regard to the issue under consideration, the state courts
will rule in favor of the accused by interpreting the Federal Constitution to afford
the protection sought.110 Second, if the state courts reject the accused’s reliance on
federal constitutional protections and then also refuse to find that the state
constitution affords more expansive protection for the right asserted,111 counsel will

104. Id. at 223–24.
105. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
106. Crespin, 94 N.M. at 487–88, 612 P.2d at 717–18.
107. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
108. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991). The statute was upheld in State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, ¶ 11,
93 P.3d 1264, 1269. See Alethia V.P. Allen, Note, State v. Flores: In the Wake of Atkins v. Virginia, New Mexico
Tackles Capital Punishment for Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 35 N.M. L. REV. 557 (2005).
109. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
110. See, e.g., ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, 137 P.3d 1215. The plaintiff
sought relief under both state and Federal Constitutions in a civil action challenging an Albuquerque city ordinance
limiting the rights of registered sex offenders. The court of appeals granted relief, but confined its analysis to the
federal constitutional claims asserted, noting: “We agree that broader protections may be available under the state
constitution, and that the ACLU has preserved the issue for review. However, since we hold that the challenged
provisions violate the Fourth Amendment, we need not reach the possibly broader protections afforded under the
state constitution.” Id. ¶ 39, 137 P.3d at 1229–30.
111. For example, in State v. Sandoval, 2004-NMCA-046, 89 P.3d 92, the court of appeals rejected the
defendant’s reliance on the state constitution in arguing that proof of prior convictions used for purposes of
enhancement of his sentence should be determined by the application of the reasonable doubt standard. Sandoval
fully preserved the issue for review, relying on the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), requiring proof of allegations of facts warranting increase of sentence above the
presumptive statutuory sentence—in Apprendi, proof that the accused acted with racial animus in committing the
offense—be determined by the trier of fact using the reasonable doubt standard of proof. However, the Court had
previously rejected the requirement for proof of prior convictions using the reasonable doubt standard in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and the Apprendi Court did not overrule that case. 530
U.S. at 487.
Sandoval preserved his claim under both state and Federal Constitutions. 2004-NMCA-046, ¶¶ 2–3,
89 P.3d at 93. On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court had expressly declined to apply
Apprendi to overrule Almendarez-Torres in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and so, rejected
Sandoval’s federal constitutional claim. 2004-NMCA-046, ¶¶ 2–3, 89 P.3d at 93–94. It then considered Sandoval’s
state constitutional claim resting on article II, sections 12 and 18, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s
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have preserved the federal constitutional claim for review by the Supreme Court on
certiorari,112 or by review in federal habeas corpus.113
However, one important consequence of success on a federal constitutional claim
in state court proceedings is that the State may also petition for review in the
Supreme Court, and, if the state court has ruled too expansively, the relief it has
afforded may essentially be lost in that process.114 The significance of a state
constitutional decision lies in the fact that the United States Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to review a state court decision resting on “adequate and independent”
state law grounds. In Michigan v. Long, the Court explained:
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering
advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide
cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to avoid advisory
opinions, that we do not wish to continue to decide issues of state law that go
beyond the opinion that we review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases
to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in this case, a
state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.115

The significance of the Court’s holding is not only that state court decisions resting
on interpretation or construction of federal constitutional law, rather than state law,
are subject to review by writ of certiorari, but that decisions that arguably are
intertwined with federal constitutional analysis or ambiguous in the source of their
rationale are presumptively subject to the Court’s review.116
The potential for review on certiorari when a state court has afforded the accused
relief based upon a federal constitutional guarantee that may result in reversal might
suggest that counsel should rely exclusively on state constitutional provisions in
order to avoid the possibility that the interpretation of the Federal Constitution will
provide a basis for the United States Supreme Court’s assertion of jurisdiction. But

disposition of the question was inadequate based upon all three generic challenges recognized in State v. Gomez,
1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d 1, 7. He argued that the federal analysis was flawed; that there are structural
differences between the state and federal governments warranting different treatment of the claimed right under
state law; and that the state constitution has distinctive characteristics. 2004-NMCA-046, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d at 94.
However, the court of appeals rejected the state constitutional argument that Sandoval’s counsel had preserved at
trial and argued on appeal. Id. ¶ 7, 89 P.3d at 94.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) authorizes the U.S. Supreme Court to review by writ of certiorari “[f]inal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.…”
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) defines the federal habeas remedy for petitioners challenging convictions
imposed in state court proceedings. Under subsection (d)(1) the federal habeas court is limited to granting relief
only when the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.…”
114. E.g., New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (vacating reversal of conviction ordered by state
supreme court and remanding for further proceedings where New Mexico Supreme Court held that defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by admission of non-testifying accomplice’s statement to
police inculpating defendant).
115. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983).
116. Id. at 1042 & n.8.
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the interstitial approach, in theory, requires trial counsel to preserve claims
alternatively on federal and state law grounds in order to permit the state courts to
properly consider whether a state constitutional provision provides more expansive
protection than its federal analog. Moreover, because New Mexico courts have a
tradition of aggressive consideration of the state constitutional law alternative,
counsel should protect the client’s rights as fully as possible, assuming that reversal
of a state court holding on certiorari will then trigger review under the state law
ground argued alternatively once the case is remanded to the state courts.117
II. THE EXISTING BODY OF NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The New Mexico appellate courts have developed a substantial body of case law
in which state law sources have been used to provide more expansive protections
for individuals prosecuted for criminal offenses. Consequently, defense lawyers
practicing in the state’s courts must be familiar with those existing decisions that
may provide relief and do not require the “heavy lifting” involved in developing
arguments for further expansion of procedural rights for their clients. Similarly,
prosecutors should be alert to existing precedent in assessing the response required
to limit the applications of these protections to those situations expressly authorized
by the state courts. Generically, two particular categories of protections have been
the focus of the development of this body of law: privacy protections and due
process protections arising in the context of prior jeopardy.
A. Privacy Protection Now Recognized by New Mexico Courts
There now exists a substantial body of state constitutional law articulated by the
New Mexico Supreme Court that provides greater protection than the Federal
Constitution to the state’s residents, generally, and to criminal defendants
prosecuted in the state courts.
1. Substantive Protection of Privacy Interests
The most significant development in terms of state constitutional doctrine under
New Mexico law has involved the expansive interpretation of personal privacy
derived from article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. That section
provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or
the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.118

Although differing somewhat in wording from the Fourth Amendment, the content
of the two provisions appears to be substantially the same, with the federal
protection providing:

117. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 96.
118. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.119

Despite the relative similarity in textual language, New Mexico courts have
demonstrated their greatest activism in state constitutional interpretation with regard
to consideration of privacy interests. For instance, in State v. Gutierrez, the court
summarized this concern: “Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution
expresses the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusions.”120 This commitment has been reflected
in a range of decisions addressing arrests and searches resulting in suppression of
evidence in state courts.
a. Test for Probable Cause
As explained earlier,121 the New Mexico Supreme Court’s most important step
in its initial development in state constitutional law is reflected in its decision in
State v. Cordova,122 where the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to follow the
United States Supreme Court’s lead in replacing the Aguilar/Spinelli123 test for
determining the sufficiency of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant in
favor of the totality of circumstances test announced in Illinois v. Gates.124
b. Requirement and Execution of Warrants
In State v. Attaway,125 New Mexico developed state constitutional doctrine
without expressly departing from federal precedent126 in holding that under article
II, section 10 of the state constitution, officers executing a warrant are required to
knock and announce their intent to serve the warrant before entering a residence.127
The court considered at length the holding in Ker v. California, where a fragmented
Court considered the applicability of the common law knock-and-announce rule to
Fourth Amendment claims.128

119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120. 116 N.M. 431, 444, 863 P.2d 1052, 1065 (1993).
121. See supra Part I.A.
122. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
123. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
124. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
125. 117 N.M. 141, 151–52, 870 P.2d 103, 113–14 (1994).
126. Id. at 147, 870 P.2d at 109 (“The Supreme Court has not determined whether officers executing a search
warrant must knock and announce prior to entry. The Court follows the general rule that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only unreasonable searches.”).
127. Id. at 149, 870 P.2d at 111. The court predicated its state constitutional analysis on an objective
approach in evaluating whether a search and seizure is reasonable: “The application of objective criteria in
determining whether officers have violated the knock and announce requirements will secure the right of each
citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and, at the same time, will provide law enforcement with
clear standards of conduct.” Id.
128. Id. at 146–49, 870 P.2d at 108–11 (citing Ker, 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963)). The Court first discussed the
common law rule from Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng.Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603) and contemporary commentary. Id. at
146–48, 870 P.2d at 108–10. It next examined Ker. Id. at 147–49, 870 P.2d at 109–11. In Ker, four Justices, led
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The Attaway court relied on the prior decision of the court of appeals in State v.
Baca,129 where that court explained:
[W]e are obliged to look to the common law to determine what procedure must
be followed prior to a forced entry. We recognize that some uncertainty exists
as to common law requirements. Our view is that an officer, prior to forcible
entry, must give notice of authority and purpose, and be denied admittance. This
is a general standard. Noncompliance with this standard is justified if exigent
circumstances exist.130

The state supreme court, essentially adopting the reasoning of the court of
appeals in Baca, concluded: “We believe that the rule of announcement in Baca
rests on state constitutional grounds. The requirement that officers executing a
search warrant announce their identity and purpose and be denied admission is a
critical component of a reasonable search under Article II, Section 10.”131
The rule is not absolute, as the supreme court explained, allowing for flexibility
where strict compliance with the requirement for notice of the officers’ presence
and purpose would likely threaten their safety.132 Consequently, on the facts
presented showing a reasonable perception that the subject was dangerous, having
previously threatened police, the court held that officers were justified in entering
without strictly complying with the knock-and-announce rule.133
c. Search Incident to Arrest Under Warrant
In State v. Pittman,134 the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the
interpretation of Fourth Amendment protections relied on by the Supreme Court in
Thornton v. United States135 and Chimel v. California.136 The issue in Pittman, as
to the officer’s authority to search incident to a lawful arrest, arose in the context
of an arrest for failure to appear following a routine traffic stop and check for
outstanding warrants. The suspect had left and locked his car prior to the arrest, but
was returned to the car in order to get identification.137 When the defendant asked
the officer if he could then give the car keys to his grandmother, who lived in the
apartments where he had stopped, the officer took the keys and searched the

by Justice Clark, would have upheld the search, see 374 U.S. at 45, while Justice Brennan concluded that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment, acknowledging that under appropriate facts, the search would have been justified.
Id. 45. The dissenters viewed the officers’ actions as indicators of the reasonableness of the search, rather than
importing the common law rule into Fourth Amendment requirements. Id. at 41.
129. 87 N.M. 12, 528 P.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1974) (“New Mexico has no statute setting forth the requirements
of announcement prior to a forcible entry when executing a search warrant nor do we have a deep history of
common-law decisions on the question. Yet, recent opinions [Baca] from our intermediate appellate court have
suggested that Article II, Section 10 incorporates a knock-and-announce requirement.”).
130. Id. at 13–14, 528 P.2d at 657–58 (internal citations omitted).
131. Attaway, 171 N.M. at 150, 870 P.2d at 112.
132. Id. at 151–53 & n.7, 870 P.3d at 113–15 (noting circumstances warranting departures from rule).
133. Id. at 153–54, 870 P.3d at 115–16.
134. 2006-NMCA-006, ¶ 13, 127 P.3d 1116, 1120.
135. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
136. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
137. Pittman, 2006-NMCA-006, ¶¶ 2–3, 127 P.3d at 1118.
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vehicle, finding a loaded pistol under the front seat, resulting in the suspect being
charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, in addition to the traffic offense.138
The court recognized the concerns expressed in Chimel and Thornton regarding
the need for protection of officers from use of weapons, as well as the need to
protect against destruction of evidence, that may justify search of a vehicle incident
to a lawful arrest.139 Concluding that Pittman probably could not prevail on a federal
constitutional claim in light of the existing caselaw, the court turned to a
consideration of his state constitutional claim.140
The Pittman court looked to prior decisions in State v. Arredondo141 and State v.
Garcia,142 in which the bright line rule authorizing a search of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle pursuant to a search incident to arrest had been held
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.143 Instead of applying the
federal bright line rule, the court embraced the position taken in Garcia and
Arredondo, calling for a case-by-case determination of reasonableness of the
search.144 The Pittman court concluded: “Because of New Mexico’s strong
preference for a warrant, we hold that even after a valid arrest, one of Chimel’s two
rationales must be present before an officer may search a vehicle without a
warrant.”145
The search in Pittman could not be upheld under article II, section 10 precisely
because the arresting officer had testified that he neither felt threatened nor
expected to find any evidence of criminal activity at the time of the search.146
Rejecting the State’s speculative argument justifying the search under Chimel, the
court instead concluded, in part:
We are unpersuaded by the State’s attempts to create a sense of danger and
urgency by characterizing the grandmother as an unknown, possibly sinister
person who might use the gun to try to help Defendant escape, or who might
pose some danger to the public. During the suppression hearing, no testimony
was elicited about the grandmother’s nature or the officer’s judgment of her
nature. Moreover, if the officer really feared possible consequences from
delivering the keys to Defendant’s grandmother, he had the option of keeping the
car keys and transporting Defendant to jail.147

138. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 127 P.3d at 1118.
139. Id. ¶¶ 7–9, 127 P.3d at 1118–19 (“Underlying the weapon removal rationale for a search incident to an
arrest is a very ‘legitimate and weighty’ concern for officer safety.”); id. ¶ 10, 127 P.3d at 1119 (“The evidence
concealment/destruction rationale for a search incident to an arrest is based on the need to act quickly or else lose
critical evidence of a crime which the police have probable cause to believe the suspect committed.”).
140. Id. ¶ 13, 127 P.3d at 1120.
141. 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 28, 944 P.2d 276, 285, overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999NMCA-107, ¶ 29, 987 P.2d 409, 418.
142. 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 30, 116 P.3d 72, 79.
143. Pittman, 2006-NMCA-006, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d at 1121. The federal bright line rule was articulated in New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.”).
144. Pittman, 2006-NMCA-006, ¶ 25, 127 P.3d at 1123.
145. Id. ¶ 16, 127 P.3d at 1121.
146. Id. ¶ 4, 127 P.3d at 1118.
147. Id. ¶ 19, 127 P.3d at 1121–22.
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The court similarly rejected the remainder of the State’s speculative arguments and
held that article II, section 10 requires a showing of threat to the officer’s safety or
realistic concern over the potential destruction or loss of evidence before the search
of an automobile is reasonable as incident to the driver’s lawful arrest.148 The court
noted in its analysis that its conclusion was based upon the “distinctive state
characteristics” of New Mexico reflected in prior decisions rejecting application of
the federal bright-line standard.149
d. Limitations on Arrest
In two cases the New Mexico Court of Appeals has concluded that the state
constitutional protection against seizure affords broader protection against arrest
than that required by the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. In State v. Bricker,150 the court held that a custodial arrest for an
offense for which only citation was authorized by the legislature violated state
constitutional protections, requiring suppression of evidence seized during a search
of the arrestee at the station.151 Because the custodial arrest was not authorized by
state law, the court concluded that it was “unreasonable” under article II, section 10
of the state constitution.152
Bricker followed the court’s decision in State v. Rodarte,153 in which the court
held that an arrest for a non-jailable offense solely on the basis of probable cause
violates the protection afforded by the state constitution.154 The Rodarte court noted
that the Supreme Court, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,155 had held that a custodial
arrest for a non-jailable offense is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, but the
Rodarte court concluded that greater privacy protection was afforded by article II,
section 10, finding that such arrests are prohibited under state law in the absence of
“specific and articulable” facts justifying arrest.156 The court found that the facts did
not warrant Rodarte’s arrest:
In this case, there do not appear to have been any circumstances that made it
necessary for the officer to arrest Defendant. There is no suggestion that
Defendant acted in a violent or confrontational manner. He was not driving the
vehicle, and he appears to have complied with all of the officer’s requests. In
these circumstances, a citation would likely have “serve[d] the State’s…law
enforcement interests every bit as effectively as an arrest.”157

In both Rodarte and Bricker, the state court suggested its view that the Atwater
majority’s analysis was flawed, and instead followed Justice O’Connor’s reasoning
148. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 127 P.3d at 1122–23.
149. Id. ¶ 25, 127 P.3d at 1123.
150. 2006-NMCA-052, 134 P.3d 800. The defendant was arrested under a municipal ordinance authorizing
arrest for the offense of driving while license suspended, in conflict with a state statute, NMSA 1978, § 66-8123(A) (1989). Id. ¶¶ 3–4 & n.1, 134 P.3d at 801.
151. Id. ¶¶ 2, 30, 134 P.3d at 801, 807–08.
152. Id. ¶ 20, 134 P.3d at 805.
153. 2005-NMCA-141, 125 P.3d 647.
154. Id. ¶ 1, 125 P.3d at 647.
155. 532 U.S. 318, 323, 354 (2001).
156. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d at 651.
157. Id. ¶ 15, 125 P.3d at 651.
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for the four Atwater dissenters.158 It rejected arrest based solely on probable cause,
holding that in order to support custodial arrest “there must be specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion of a full custodial arrest.”159 The court
noted not only its view that Justice O’Connor’s analysis in her Atwater dissent was
the better view, but also that her approach comported with traditional New Mexico
analysis.160
e. Border Stops
The significance of New Mexico’s international border shared with Mexico
cannot be underestimated, particularly considering the significance of cross-border
immigration and drug-trafficking prosecutions in federal161 and state criminal
dockets. In State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, the court held that extended detention of the
accused at a border checkpoint was unlawful under article II, section 10.162 In doing
so, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ conclusion that the detention
also violated federal law.163 Both courts noted that federal law does not require the
showing of “reasonable suspicion,” required in State v. Galloway, to justify
extended detention at the border.164 While the court of appeals relied on Tenth
Circuit caselaw indicating that detention requires only “suspicious
circumstances,”165 the supreme court corrected the appellate court on this point,
holding that no finding of suspicion is required for detention at the border under
federal law, observing: “Under federal law, Defendant’s detention constituted a
routine border checkpoint stop and therefore need not have been supported by
suspicious circumstances.”166
In holding that article II, section 10 provides greater protection for border
detainees than the Fourth Amendment, the court explained: “Our examination of
New Mexico law, however, does reveal distinctive characteristics that command our
departure from federal law governing border checkpoint detentions.”167 One
important factor for the court was the consistent recognition in prior New Mexico
decisions of the higher requirement of suspicion required for detention under state
law, even when the detention arises at the border, noted by the court in CardenasAlvarez.168 The court also noted its general understanding of the scope of article II,

158. State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 22–23, 134 P.3d 800, 805; Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 8, 125
P.3d at 649.
159. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d at 651 (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)); see also Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 23, 134 P.3d at 805–06.
160. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d at 651.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting “the agent’s duty
to prevent the unauthorized entry of individuals into this country and to prevent the smuggling of contraband”).
162. 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 5, 25 P.3d 225, 228. For in-depth analysis of Cardenas-Alvarez, see Turner, supra
note 12.
163. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 7, 25 P.3d at 228 (citing State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2000NMCA-009, ¶ 18, 995 P.2d 492, 497–98).
164. Id. ¶ 12, 25 P.3d at 230.
165. United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889 (10th Cir. 1993).
166. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 7, 25 P.3d at 228.
167. Id. ¶ 14, 25 P.3d at 231.
168. Id. ¶ 16, 25 P.3d at 231.
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section 10 as broader than that afforded by the Fourth Amendment based on its
traditional view that the individual does not suffer a diminished expectation of
privacy simply because he is in his automobile, noting that “[t]he extra layer of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a
distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law.”169
f. Warrantless Arrests and Stops
In Campos v. State, the court held, in interpreting the state constitutional
warrant requirement, that a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause and
exigent circumstances.171 The court declined to hold that the New Mexico
requirement paralleled the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in United States v. Watson,172 where the Court stated that criminal
prosecutions based on warrantless arrests made in public should not be encumbered
“with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances.”173
The court noted that in previous warrantless arrest cases, the facts consistently
demonstrated the existence of exigent circumstances, such as evidence of attempted
flight, suggestion of destruction of evidence, or the fact that defendant was
armed.174 In Campos, however, the fact that the suspect was arrested while driving
did not constitute an exigent circumstance because the officer was aware the day
before that the suspect would be driving his car the following day.175 Based on prior
state decisions and the constitutional preference for use of warrants, the court
concluded:
170

[O]ur constitution and case law lead us to hold that for a warrantless arrest to be
reasonable the arresting officer must show that the officer had probable cause to
believe that the person arrested had committed or was about to commit a felony
and some exigency existed that precluded the officer from securing a warrant.
If an officer observes the person arrested committing a felony, exigency will be
presumed.176

In State v. Ochoa,177 the court of appeals, on remand from the state supreme
court, departed from Supreme Court precedent in Whren v. United States,178 holding
that pretextual stops are inconsistent with the protections affording individual
privacy in automobiles under the New Mexico Constitution.179 The court expressed
169. Id. ¶ 15, 25 P.3d at 231.
170. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
171. Id. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
172. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
173. Id. at 423.
174. Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
175. Id. at 160, 870 P.2d at 122. The court noted that generally the fact that the suspect is driving will satisfy
the requirement for proof of an exigency justifying immediate arrest without obtaining a warrant, citing State v.
Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455–56, 641 P.2d 484, 486–87 (1982) and distinguishing the two decisions because the
officer had prior knowledge that Campos would be driving and could presumably have obtained a warrant to arrest.
176. Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
177. 2009-NMCA-002, 206 P.3d 143, cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012, 203 P.3d 103. The supreme court
reversed the initial reversal of the defendant’s conviction by the court of appeals. State v. Ochoa, 2006-NMCA-131,
144 P.3d 132, rev’d, 2008-NMSC-023, 182 P.3d 130.
178. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
179. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 12, 206 P.3d at 148.
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concern over the virtually unbridled police discretion that would result from using
enforcement of the traffic laws pretextually to conduct investigations not based on
probable cause.180
g. Search Incident to Warrantless Automobile Stop
In Cardenas-Alvarez, the court noted its general understanding of the scope of
article II, section 10 when compared with the Fourth Amendment, observing: “The
extra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving
automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law” based on
the court’s rejection of “the federal automobile exception to the warrant
requirement” in “dismiss[ing] the notion that an individual lowers his expectation
of privacy when he enters an automobile.”181
Moreover, the New Mexico constitutional preference for warrants was paramount
in the court’s reasoning in another automobile case, State v. Rowell.182 The court
explained: “‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable,’ subject only to well
delineated exceptions.”183 The Rowell court considered alternative theories
supporting seizure of weapons from an automobile located on a school parking lot
after being stopped for speeding. The seizure also included drugs and drug
paraphernalia triggered by the observation of a packet of marijuana in plain view
in the suspect’s pocket. Once the driver was arrested for possession of marijuana,
a further search of the vehicle produced the paraphernalia, and later, he told the
officer that there was a shotgun in the back seat of the car.184
The court considered two theories supporting the seizure of the gun from the car.
First, the State argued that the search could be justified as incident to an arrest and
second, that the search was supported by the presence of exigent circumstances.185
The court rejected the former, affirming its prior decision in State v. Gomez that
required a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances for search of an
automobile.186 Because the suspect had already been removed from the automobile
and the area searched was no longer within his immediate access, the court held that
under New Mexico law, the authority to conduct the search of the automobile as a
search incident to arrest could not be justified.187 This holding departed from the
Supreme Court’s holding in New York v. Belton,188 permitting searches of the area
within the arrestee’s previous reach even when he had already been removed from
the vehicle,189 a position that the Court itself retreated from in its decision in

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 206 P.3d at 150.
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 225, 231.
2008-NMSC-041, 188 P.3d 95.
Id. ¶ 10, 188 P.3d at 98 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
Id. ¶ 2, 188 P.3d at 97.
Id. ¶ 5, 188 P.3d at 97.
Id. ¶ 1, 188 P.3d at 97, aff’g 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
Id. ¶ 25, 188 P.3d at 101.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 460.
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Arizona v. Gant.190 In Gant, the majority rejected the bright line rule of Belton191
authorizing police to search the vehicle subsequent to the arrest of the driver, opting
for a more limited approach in which once the arrest has been effected and the
occupants removed from the vehicle, the authority to search is restricted by the
necessity of showing probable cause.192 The majority concluded that “circumstances
unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is
reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.”193
The Rowell court observed that in Thornton v. United States, the Supreme Court
extended Belton to include searches of automobiles that had previously been
occupied by an arrestee even when he had not been removed from the vehicle at the
time of the arrest.194 The combined effect of Belton and Thornton had been to
virtually eviscerate the warrant requirement with regard to automobile searches.
While continuing to recognize the validity of automobile searches incident to lawful
stops or arrests when exigent circumstances justify the officer’s immediate action,195
the Rowell court held the officer’s authority to search was based only on exigent
circumstances making it impractical to first secure a warrant.196 The holding in
Gant, reflecting the majority’s appreciation that a number of states, like New
Mexico, had declined to follow Belton,197 may not provide additional protection for
privacy interests than that afforded under Rowell and Gomez in interpreting the state
constitution. However, consistent with the interstitial approach to constitutional
construction, it does suggest that automobile privacy-based suppression issues may
be resolved under Gant as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, rather than on the
state constitutional protection.198

190. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
191. 453 U.S. at 460. Justice Breyer, dissenting in Gant, criticized the majority’s rejection of the “brightline” rule of Belton, arguing that the considerable reliance on the Court’s formulation there, including its
subsequent decision in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 17 (2004), did not warrant rejection of that line
of authority based on stare decisis considerations, suggesting that he might have joined the majority had Gant
presented an issue of first impression for the Court. 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714 (majority opinion) (“[W]e hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the
vehicle.”).
193. Id.
194. State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 16, 188 P.3d 95, 99 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 17. (2004)).
195. See id. ¶¶ 23, 28, 188 P.3d at 101, 102.
196. Id. ¶ 36, 188 P.3d at 103.
197. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars,
and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment
principles.”).
198. However, having firmly articulated the state constitutional provision, it would also seem reasonable that
counsel relying on established state constitutional precedent would not in any sense forfeit that protection by failing
to assert a Fourth Amendment claim based on Gant. Given the split decision in Gant, with Justices Alito, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy and Brennan, in part, dissenting, id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting),
counsel might well be wary that a Fourth Amendment-based suppression decision could eventually prompt the State
to seek review by certiorari in an effort to overturn or distinguish Gant. A decision resting squarely on the state
constitutional protection applied in Gomez and Rowell would not be subject to review by the United States Supreme
Court since it would rest on an adequate and independent state law ground. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983); see also supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
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Rowell reflects not only the recognition of a differing degree of protection
afforded by the state constitutional privacy protection, but also serves as an example
of departure from federal constitutional interpretation when the state court finds the
Supreme Court’s analysis is flawed.199 However, the Rowell court did not hold that
the seizure of the weapon was unreasonable, because the existence of the weapon
on school property constituted an exigent circumstance supporting seizure without
a warrant,200 and the officer had probable cause once the suspect admitted the
presence of the shotgun in his car on school property.201 Thus, even though the state
constitution may afford more protection to the individual with respect to one theory,
that protection may not bar official action based on an alternative theory.
Similarly, the court of appeals held that a search made pursuant to a vehicle stop
may be justified by a showing of exigent circumstances in State v. Weidner.202
Where the officer observes an item in plain view after making a lawful stop that he
reasonably believes to be evidence of crime, the seizure is “consistent with the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.”203 Weidner reaffirmed
the principle in Gomez204 regarding the requirement for exigent circumstances to
support a warrantless search of an automobile, reflecting a departure from federal
precedent in United States v. Ross.205
h. Road Blocks
In State v. Madalena, the court applied an eight-factor test for determining the
reasonableness of stop and detention by police using a roadblock.207 The court
concluded that this test was stricter than the test recognized by the Supreme
Court.208 The defendant argued that New Mexico requires greater protection of
personal privacy interests under article II, section 10, of the state constitution,
conceding that the roadblock at which he was stopped, detained, and arrested for
driving while intoxicated would have passed the Fourth Amendment test for
reasonableness209 applied by the Supreme Court in Michigan Department of State
206

199. See Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 18, 188 P.3d at 100.
200. Id. ¶ 36, 188 P.3d at 103.
201. Id. ¶ 27, 188 P.3d at 102.
202. 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 1025, 1030–31.
203. State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 17, 184 P.3d 1045, 1049; see also State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC006, ¶ 39, 932 P.2d 1, 12 (Exigent circumstances are defined as “‘an emergency situation requiring swift action
to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect
or destruction of evidence.’” (quoting State v. Copeland, 105 N.M. 27, 31, 727 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Ct. App. 1986))).
204. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 33–40, 932 P.2d 1, 10–12.
205. 456 U.S. 798, 800, 809 (1982) (holding that police officers having probable cause to believe a lawfully
stopped vehicle contains concealed contraband may search containers and compartments not within plain view even
without prior issuance of search warrant).
206. 121 N.M. 63, 908 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1995).
207. Id. at 70–71, 908 P.2d at 763–64.
208. Id. at 69, 908 P.2d at 762. The court’s opinion in Madalena provides a concise and excellent history
of the development of state constitutional doctrine relating to protection of individual privacy interests affording
broader protection than that ensured in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions. See id. at 68–70, 908
P.2d at 761–63. It also provides a valuable survey of the development of state constitutional protections in the
context of roadblocks in other jurisdictions. Id. at 68 nn.1–2, 98 P.2d at 761.
209. Id. at 67, 908 P.2d at 760. The defendant also relied on article II, section 4, which provides that “[a]ll
persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and
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Police v. Sitz.210 Roadblocks had previously been upheld as constitutional under
state law in City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt211 and State v. Bates,212 but the
Madalena court noted that while roadblocks had been upheld in Bates, the
defendant there did not assert that greater protection was afforded to individual
privacy interests under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.213
In Betancourt, the court had noted eight factors governing the conduct of the
roadblock that ensured adequate protection of individual privacy interests.214
However, the Supreme Court, in Sitz, had upheld use of a more general balancing
test of public safety, effectiveness of roadblocks, and personal privacy interests215
in determining that a roadblock was not violative of Fourth Amendment
protections.216 But, in Madalena, the court noted that the eight-factor test applied
in Betancourt reflected the constitutional protection afforded under article II,
section 10, identifying yet another aspect of the privacy protection in which the
state provision is more expansive than the Fourth Amendment.217 The court
reasoned that the factors identified in Betancourt served to establish “objective
criteria” by which the reasonableness of a search or seizure can be assessed,
distinguishing the state constitutional protection from the more fluid balancing test
employed as a Fourth Amendment constitutional threshold in Sitz.218
2. Fundamental Reliance on the Exclusionary Rule
The state appellate courts have secured enforcement of the state constitutional
privacy protection in significant ways. First, in Snyder and Wagoner, the court of
appeals held that the remedy for a violation of the privacy protection afforded by
the state constitution is exclusion of evidence seized in violation of state law.219
Second, in State v. Lujan,220 that court also recognized the application of “the fruit

obtaining safety and happiness.” Id.
210. 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). Subsequently, in Sitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135, 139
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993), roadblocks were held violative of state constitutional
protections, as noted by the Madalena court, 121 N.M. at 68 n.2, 908 P.2d at 768.
211. 105 N.M. 655, 657, 735 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1987).
212. 120 N.M. 457, 463, 902 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Ct. App. 1995).
213. Madalena, 121 N.M. at 67, 908 P.2d at 760.
214. Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 658–59, 735 P.2d at 1164–65. The eight safeguards include guidelines for the
role of supervisory personnel in establishing policy and directing the roadblock operation; restriction on discretion
afforded officers operating the roadblock in selection of vehicles to be stopped; consideration of safety in location
of roadblock to avoid undue traffic congestion or possible peril for motorists or officers; selection of a reasonable
location, including avoiding locations likely to result in stops of automobiles driven predominantly by members
of particular ethnic groups, i.e., prevention of profiling in the location of the roadblock; establishing reasonable
time limits for the operations, relating especially to the times when intoxicated drivers are most likely to be on the
road; using devices to identify the roadblock as an official operation to motorists; limiting duration of stops to
reasonably achieve purpose of the roadblock; and affording the public notification, in advance, of the use of a
roadblock.
215. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448–50.
216. Id. at 455.
217. Madalena, 121 N.M. at 69, 908 P.2d at 762.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 14.
220. 2008-NMCA-003, 175 P.3d 327.
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of the poisonous tree doctrine,” extending the reach of the exclusionary rule to
evidence ultimately seized as a direct result of an illegal search.221
In State v. Gutierrez,222 the court declined to follow223 the Supreme Court’s lead
in United States v. Leon224 in its holding that the rule of exclusion of evidence did
not require suppression of evidence seized in good faith reliance on a defective
search warrant.225 The Gutierrez court discerned that the state policy on exclusion
is not predicated on deterrence of police misconduct, an approach that would
arguably not be served if the police officer relies on a defective warrant in good
faith because it cannot be directed at an officer’s good faith understanding of the
warrant’s legality if designed to deter illegal conduct.226 Instead, the court viewed
exclusion as necessary to restore the parties to their positions had the illegal
intrusion on privacy never occurred: “Denying the government the fruits of
unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the
same extent as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.”227
Another aspect of the rule of exclusion to illegal seizures or searches in violation
of state constitutional provisions or state law is worth noting. In Virginia v.
Moore,228 the Supreme Court reinforced the autonomy of state courts to develop
state law alternative theories for disposition of claims raising federal constitutional
protection analogs. The Moore Court held that where state actors violate privacy
rights protected under state constitutional provisions or statutes, but not by the
Fourth Amendment, the suppression of the improperly seized evidence is not
binding upon state courts.229 Thus, while violations of Fourth Amendment rights
require suppression of evidence under Mapp v. Ohio,230 the prophylactic rule
designed to prevent constitutional violations in the investigation process does not
necessarily apply to violations for acts contrary only to state law.
The Moore decision recognizes greater autonomy in the enforcement of state law,
affording state courts the option of adopting suppression of illegally or
impermissibly seized evidence as a remedy, but not to the exclusion of alternate
remedies. Thus, while New Mexico recognizes exclusion as a necessary remedy for
violation of the state constitutional privacy protection, it does so as a matter of state
constitutional policy, rather than a policy mandating exclusion as a result of federal
constitutional requirement.
The significance of New Mexico precedent in this respect will likely be
reinforced because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Herring v. United
States,231 where a 5–4 majority again diluted the protections afforded by the Fourth

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. ¶¶ 9–21, 175 P.3d at 329–32.
116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993). For in-depth analysis of Gutierrez, see Oliver, supra note 10.
Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 922.
Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.
Id.
128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
Id. at 1606–07.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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Amendment. The majority concluded that suppression of evidence was not
constitutionally required where the evidence was seized pursuant to a search
conducted as a result of the officer’s good faith belief that there was an outstanding
warrant for the defendant.232 The warrant had been recalled, but as a result of a
clerical error, it had not been removed from the active list.233
The Herring majority predicated its analysis on the Court’s observation in
Illinois v. Gates: “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that
a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the
exclusionary rule applies.”234 Analyzing the deterrent value of the rule in light of
prior decisions235 and holding that unintentional violations of the Fourth
Amendment do not warrant exclusion of illegally seized evidence, the Court held:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases,
the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error
in this case does not rise to that level.236

The Court’s decision does not eviscerate the exclusionary rule, but it certainly
reflects a step in the direction of restriction of the requirement for its application,
effectively opening the door to case-by-case consideration of whether the
constitutional violation was the result of deliberate or grossly negligent actions by
police. Arguably, it serves to shift the default position from exclusion to admission,
perhaps ultimately requiring that officers acted deliberately, recklessly or with gross
negligence in exercising their authority to arrest and search.237 The deterrent effect
will necessarily be diluted as trial courts, acting as fact-finders, will find it
convenient to conclude that any error in the exercise of an officer’s discretion was
the result of misperception or inadvertence.
Herring is consistent with an earlier decision of the Court in Hudson v.
Michigan, a plurality holding in which Justice Kennedy provided a fifth vote to
avoid exclusion of evidence seized by police entering a residence with a warrant,
but without properly knocking and announcing before entering.238 Justice Kennedy,
while arguing that the exclusionary rule remained intact, nevertheless, voted to
uphold the search and seizure because “the relevant evidence was discovered not

232. Id. at 704.
233. Id. at 698.
234. Id. at 700 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
235. See id. at 699–701 (discussing, for example, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984)).
236. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
237. The extent to which the Herring majority is willing to excuse police infractions on individual privacy
is illustrated by its recognition of a threshold for liability in a context similar to the facts presented in the case. The
court stated, “If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly
made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our
cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 703. The standard for suppression
would virtually insulate all police conduct in maintaining a warrant system because flaws approaching those
justifying exclusion under the Herring majority’s analysis would almost certainly compromise the ability of police
to operate effectively.
238. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
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because of a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search
pursuant to a lawful warrant.” 239
The Court’s recent retreat from reliance on the exclusionary rule to enforce
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment may ultimately have little effect on
New Mexico prosecutions. First, the state courts have rejected application of federal
doctrine in comparable situations, rejecting the “good faith” principle excusing
police error in United States v. Leon in State v. Gutierrez,240 and affirmatively
adopting a “knock and announce” principle as a component of the state
constitutional protection in State v. Attaway.241 The independent approach to state
constitutional construction demonstrated in these New Mexico decisions suggests
that regardless of the extent to which the Supreme Court may retreat from exclusion
as a primary means of inducing law enforcement compliance with constitutional
guarantees, New Mexico courts will remain firmly committed to prior decisions
construing and applying article II, section 10.
B. Double or Prior Jeopardy and Due Process Protections
The New Mexico Supreme Court has also been active in explaining the
protections afforded by article II, section 15 of the state constitution. The court has
given particular attention to the double jeopardy clause. Section 15 provides:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and when the
indictment, information or affidavit upon which any person is convicted charges
different offenses or different degrees of the same offense and a new trial is
granted the accused, he may not again be tried for an offense or degree of the
offense greater than the one of which he was convicted.242

Similarly, section 18, the state constitutional provision recognizing due process,
remains an important independent source of relief on some claims. It provides, “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights under law
shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.”243
1. Double or Prior Jeopardy Protection
One of the most powerful decisions reflecting state constitutional protections
issued by the New Mexico Supreme Court is State v. Breit.244 There, the court held
that section 15 may be asserted to bar reprosecution in the event a trial is terminated
as a result of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in mistrial. Citing its prior decision

239. Id. at 604 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Assuming that the infraction
occurs when police execute an otherwise valid warrant, it is difficult to ascertain when a knock-and-announce
violation would ever require suppression. But Justice Kennedy observed that if a “widespread pattern of violations”
could be demonstrated, that would be cause for “grave concern.” Still, he was unwilling to concede that even if the
common practice included violation of the rule, exclusion of seized evidence would be necessary or justified. Id.
240. See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text.
242. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
243. Id. § 18.
244. 1996-NMSC-067, 930 P.2d 792.
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in State v. Day, and adopting its language, the Breit court defined the parameters of
the state rule: “In New Mexico, the rule barring reprosecution applies in those
situations in which ‘the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the purpose of
precipitating a motion for a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon
retrial, or subjecting the defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of
successive trials.’”245 The Breit court contrasted this rule with the Supreme Court’s
position in Oregon v. Kennedy, where it had held that mistrial on defendant’s
motion barred retrial only when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct designed to
“goad” the defendant into moving for mistrial.246 Rather than conforming the Day
rule to the Supreme Court’s more limited formulation for protection under the Fifth
Amendment, the Breit court embraced Day and reaffirmed it as the appropriate
standard for state prosecutions.247 The court noted that Day followed an earlier
expression in United States v. Dinitz,248 where the Supreme Court condemned
misconduct in more aggressive terms:
Prior to Kennedy, federal courts pointed to a broader range of prosecutorial
misconduct that would bar retrial of a defendant. These included situations in
which the prosecution demonstrated gross negligence or intentional misconduct,
was motivated by bad faith or malice, engaged in oppressive tactics, and acted
to seriously prejudice and harass the defendant.249

But the Breit court was unwilling to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in retreating
from its more ambitious expressions to the narrow rule limiting application of
double jeopardy protection to situations in which the prosecution goads the defense
into moving for mistrial. Instead of requiring the accused to sustain the burden of
proving this degree of intent or malice on the part of the prosecution, the state
supreme court concluded: “We believe, however, that the Kennedy court
improvidently failed to weigh the effects of the misconduct of prosecutors who do
not subjectively intend to provoke a mistrial.”250
The court then explained that, having adopted the reasoning of the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts in formulating the Day test, the Supreme Court’s
restriction of the federal protection in the subsequent decision in Kennedy would
not require New Mexico to retreat from its former position in order to remain
consistent with federal doctrine.251 Thus, the court reaffirmed its position in Day,
announcing the following rule defining the scope of the state constitutional double
jeopardy protection:
Retrial is barred under Article II, Section 15, of the New Mexico Constitution,
when improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it
cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial, and if
the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial, and if the official

245. Id. ¶ 2, 930 P.2d at 795 (quoting State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 757, 615 P.2d 142, 146 (1980)).
246. Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982)).
247. See id. ¶ 3, 930 P.2d at 795.
248. See id. ¶ 26, 930 P.2d at 801 (“Th[e Day] standard was an amalgam of various pronouncements by the
United States Supreme Court.” (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976))).
249. Id. ¶ 17, 930 P.2d at 798 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611).
250. Id. ¶ 18, 930 P.2d at 798.
251. See id. ¶ 27, 930 P.2d at 801–02.
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either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting
mistrial, retrial, or reversal.252

Finally, applying its rule to the facts in the case, the court concluded that the
prosecutor’s misconduct “was unrelenting and pervasive,” relying on the findings
of the trial court that included reference to non-verbal, “wordless misconduct” that
would typically not appear in a record or transcript of the proceedings.253 Holding
that mistrial was the only cure for the cumulative effect of the misconduct, which
was to deny the defendant a fair trial, the supreme court held that re-trial was barred
by the state constitutional double jeopardy protection.254
In State v. Lynch, the supreme court found that the defendant’s re-trial on a
charge of first-degree murder would not be barred under the Fifth Amendment
following the reversal of his conviction for second-degree murder based on trial
error.255 The court reasoned that because Lynch had never been acquitted by
implication of the first-degree murder,256 having only been tried for the offense of
second degree, federal case law would not bar him from being tried for the greater
offense since the case was reversed and remanded on appeal.257
However, the state constitutional protection against double jeopardy is phrased
in terms of more specific language than the Fifth Amendment, which simply
provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall…be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” In comparison, article II, section 15 reads:
No person shall…be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and when the
indictment, information or affidavit upon which any person is convicted charges
different offenses or different degrees of the same offense and a new trial is
granted the accused, he [or she] may not again be tried for an offense or degree
of the offense greater than the one of which he [or she] was convicted.258

The interpretation of the meaning of the concluding clause confronted the Lynch
court because the State prosecuted the defendant for first-degree murder following
reversal of his conviction on second-degree murder based on newly available
evidence of the defendant’s expressed intent to kill the victim based on techniques
he claimed to have learned in prison. The defendant’s admissions were apparently

252. Id. ¶ 32, 930 P.2d at 803.
253. Id. ¶ 45, 930 P.2d at 806.
254. See id. ¶ 48, 930 P.2d at 806–07.
255. State v. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 4, 11, 74 P.3d 73, 75, 76; see also Cara Mickelsen, Note, Adding
Charges on Retrial: Double Jeopardy, Interstitialism, and State v. Lynch, 34 N.M. L. REV. 539 (2004) (providing
an in-depth analysis of Lynch).
256. Acquittal by implication occurs when the jury is instructed on greater and lesser degrees of the offense
and convicts on the lesser. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 327–29 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 190–91 (1957).
257. See Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶ 10, 74 P.3d at 76 (citing Green, 355 U.S. at 189 (holding that a
defendant who obtains a reversal for trial error on appeal resulting in a remand for new trial essentially “waives”
his double jeopardy protection in moving for the reversal)).
258. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15. The court noted the parallel language in the state statute implementing the
constitutional protection:
When the indictment, information or complaint charges different crimes or different degrees of
the same crime and a new trial is granted the accused, he [or she] may not again be tried for a
crime or degree of the crime greater than the one of which he [or she] was originally convicted.
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d at 77 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963)).
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made to a witness prior to the crime, but were not disclosed to the prosecution prior
to the initial trial in the case. Once aware of this additional evidence of deliberate
intent, the prosecution recharged him with first-degree murder.259
Here, the issue required resolution of the additional language appearing in the
New Mexico Constitution, rather than simply interpretation of language paralleling
the Federal Constitution in light of state tradition. In a 3–2 split decision, the
majority concluded that the language of article II, section 15 did, in fact, require
reversal of Lynch’s subsequent conviction.260 In reaching that decision, the majority
rejected the State’s argument that the constitutional language would not apply
unless an accused was “again” being tried for the higher degree of offense; since
Lynch was not tried for first-degree murder originally, his second trial would not
reflect that he was being tried “again” for this offense.261 Instead, the majority
concluded “[t]he phrase ‘again be tried’ refers to any subsequent prosecution,
regardless of whether the greater offense was charged in the original trial.”262
Moreover, in considering section 30-1-10, the implementing legislation,263 the
majority observed that the Legislature had clarified the arguably confusing
reference to being tried “again,”264 suggesting that “the Legislature was attempting
to articulate the protections of Article II, Section 15 as being broader than those of
the federal constitution.”265
In holding for Lynch, the court continued its willingness to find more expansive
protections for individual criminal defendants under the state constitution than those
recognized under comparable federal provisions. The decision is particularly
important, however, because not only did the state constitution come into play, but
the court’s interpretation was clearly influenced by other state law, reminding
counsel that not only can a state law argument be grounded in the constitution, but
also in the state’s statutes and rules of procedure or evidence.266
Finally, in State v. Nunez, the supreme court held that while the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Federal Constitution does not prevent the state from bringing separate
criminal and civil forfeiture actions for the same offense under the Controlled
Substances Act, forfeiture of property related to drug crimes is considered

259. See Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 2–5, 74 P.3d at 74–75.
260. See id. ¶ 26, 74 P.3d at 81.
261. See id. ¶ 16, 74 P.3d at 78.
262. Id.
263. See supra note 258.
264. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶ 22, 74 P.3d at 79–80 (“The statute omits the phrase ‘upon which any person
has been convicted’ following ‘indictment’ at the beginning of the sentence, and adds the word ‘originally’ before
‘convicted,’ at the end of the sentence.”).
265. Id.
266. For example, in State v. Henderson, 2006-NMCA-059, 136 P.3d 1005, the court considered the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment objection to admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of the complaining
witness who could not be located to be subpoenaed for trial. The court observed:
We first determine whether the preliminary hearing testimony was properly admitted under the
Rules of Evidence because if the hearsay testimony was improperly admitted to Defendant’s
prejudice, we are not required to decide the Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)]
constitutional issue. The admissibility of evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule is separate
from the objection based on confrontation grounds, and its admission is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.
Id. ¶ 8, 136 P.3d at 1007 (citation omitted).
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punishment under state law.267 Consequently, civil forfeiture triggers the double
jeopardy protection afforded by article II, section 15, of the New Mexico
constitution.
The Nunez court specifically rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion in United
States v. Ursurey that civil forfeiture of drug-related property does not constitute
“punishment” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.268 In applying a different
approach to state court forfeiture proceedings the supreme court looked to New
Mexico tradition in treating civil forfeiture proceedings as “punishment,”269 thus
implicating prior jeopardy protections when prosecution and forfeiture are the
subject of successive, rather than concurrent, proceedings. Based on state law
tradition, the court concluded that adopting an approach consistent to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the federal double jeopardy protection would effectively
require the court “to dismantle, a significant body of settled law, much of which
was decided independently of federal case law.”270
Moreover, the Nunez court noted that the statutory language implementing the
double jeopardy protection of article II, section 15 confers a broader protection than
the Fifth Amendment, in expressly prohibiting the application of waiver to prior
jeopardy claims.271 The relevant part of section 30-1-10 provides: “No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. The defense of double jeopardy may
not be waived and may be raised by the accused at any stage of a criminal
prosecution, either before or after judgment.”272 The significance of the court’s
reference to the statute is, again, that the interpretation of the state constitution is
properly reflected in the traditional understanding of its protections. The approach
to state constitutional protections reflected in legislative enactments implementing
the constitutional protections proves to be an important indicator of common
understanding and tradition with regard to the values underlying the state
constitutional protection.
In rejecting the Supreme Court’s lead in interpreting the Fifth Amendment prior
jeopardy protection restrictively with respect to use of civil forfeiture proceedings
in the seizure of drug-related property, the Nunez court offered an important
perspective on its view of the comparative values reflected in the two constitutional
provisions. It concluded: “When compared to recent United States Supreme Court
Fifth-Amendment jurisprudence, New Mexico’s constitutional and statutory
protection against double jeopardy, on its face, is of a different nature, more
encompassing and inviolate.”273 This description of the New Mexico constitutional
protection against double jeopardy should afford direction to the state courts and
counsel in shaping novel arguments about the scope of article II, section 15 in the

267. 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 1, 2 P.3d 264, 270 (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 30-3-1 to -41 (1997)); see also Janice
Greger Shipon, Note, Double Jeopardy—No Legislative Deference: Civil Forfeiture of Drug Related Property
Constitutes Double Jeopardy Under the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Nunez, 2 P.3D 264 (N.M. 1999), 32
RUTGERS L.J. 1358 (2001) (providing an in-depth analysis of Nunez).
268. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 6, 2 P.3d at 272 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)).
269. See id. ¶ 17, 2 P.3d at 272.
270. Id.
271. See id. ¶ 25, 2 P.3d at 274 (citing NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963)).
272. Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963)).
273. Id. ¶ 27, 2 P.3d at 274 (emphasis added).
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protection of individual rights from repetitive governmental action. More directly,
it resolved the question of whether multiple proceedings could be used to extract
penalties from drug offenders, rejecting this approach under state law.
2. Due Process Protection
Almost, perhaps all, protections afforded to individuals in the criminal process
suggest a broader protection based upon notions of fundamental fairness that are the
core value of due process.274 However, claims wholly dependent on due process
protection afforded by constitutional protections are not uncommon. Two important
New Mexico decisions demonstrate the way in which due process may provide the
lynchpin for development of favorable constitutional interpretation for individual
defendants.
In Montoya v. Ulibarri, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a petitioner
asserting and proving a claim of actual innocence in the state post-conviction
process is entitled to relief from his conviction.275 In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court has thus far rejected claims that actual innocence warrants relief
from the conviction as a matter of federal due process.276 Because the petitioner in
Montoya sought relief under both the state and Federal Constitutions, the court
relied on the interstitial analytical approach in responding to the claims,277
explaining: “[W]e identify both structural differences between our state government
and the federal government as well as distinctive state characteristics that warrant
a departure from the federal rule not to hear the freestanding innocence claims of
habeas petitioners.”278
The court noted that a critical difference in the posture of the federal and state
governments in addressing claims of actual innocence would lie in the principle of
federalism.279 Because the federal courts generally respect the judgments of state
courts, the intrusion into state criminal process necessitated by federal habeas
review of state court judgments is traditionally limited to those claims in which
conviction or sentence has resulted from violation of a procedural right protected
by the Federal Constitution. Absent a procedural violation, the accused’s actual
innocence does not give rise to an independent due process violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that federal courts are free to intervene to force the release of innocent state court
defendants, even, thus far, when execution would result from failure to intervene.280
274. Fundamental fairness is intrinsic within the concept of due process that is provided by the New Mexico
constitution. See State v. Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, ¶ 17, 945 P.2d 957, 962.
275. 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 163 P.3d 476, 478. See infra Part III.B.1.e. The New Mexico constitution
expressly recognizes due process and equal protection concepts that generally parallel those afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The state constitutional provision reads: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights
under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
276. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
277. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 14, 163 P.3d at 481.
278. Id. ¶ 19, 163 P.3d at 482–83.
279. See id. ¶ 20, 163 P.3d at 483.
280. Id. ¶ 15, 163 P.3d at 481–82 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (“[A] claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not
itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his
otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”)).
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The New Mexico court, operating without the constraint of federalism limiting
the authority of the state courts,281 noted: “We believe that to ignore a claim of
actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.”282 Instead of restricting
application of habeas corpus to claims based on procedural violations only, the
court concluded that the refusal to address a freestanding claim of actual innocence
would ultimately compromise the prestige and authority of the judiciary.283 This led
the court to recognize broader state constitutional due process protection for New
Mexico defendants than that afforded the same defendants under the Federal Due
Process Clause, concluding, “in view of our state interest in insuring accuracy and
the superior ability of our state courts to make accurate factual findings, we find
sufficient reason to depart from the federal decision not to recognize freestanding
innocence claims brought by habeas petitioners.”284
In another important state constitutional due process case, State v. Vallejos,285 the
court held that the entrapment defense implicated due process values precisely
because it arises from a claim of excessive or outrageous governmental conduct.
The court concluded that the state constitutional protection afforded a basis for this
substantive defense that could not be constrained by legislation.286 Rejecting the
argument that judicial construction of the parameters of the defense would
constitute an improper invasion on power reserved to the legislature, the court
affirmed its obligation to interpret the state constitution, including those provisions
that protect against “arbitrary and oppressive governmental conduct.”287 In
proceeding to consider the extent to which the entrapment defense is dictated by due
process considerations, the court observed: “The doctrine of separation of powers
does not preclude us in any way from recognizing a due process violation where
police exceed the standards of proper investigation.”288
But Vallejos did not reflect a deliberate departure from federal doctrine; instead,
the court expressly relied on federal decisions,289 and decisions from other
jurisdictions,290 in affirming the protection afforded by reliance on entrapment when
governmental action exceeds the proper limits recognized as consistent with the
state constitution’s due process provision. However, the Vallejos court did
recognize a significant distinction in the way in which the entrapment defense may
be viewed in terms of a subjective perspective—emphasizing the legislative

281. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 163 P.3d at 483.
282. Id. ¶ 23, 163 P.3d at 484.
283. “Rather than being concerned with principles of federalism, the New Mexico Constitution is obligated
to protect our State’s sovereignty. Intrinsic within state sovereignty is an interest protecting the credibility of the
state judiciary.” Id. ¶ 21, 163 P.3d at 483 (citations omitted).
284. Id.
285. 1997-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 30–32, 945 P.2d 957, 965–66.
286. Id. ¶ 32, 945 P.2d at 966.
287. Id. ¶ 31, 945 P.2d at 966 (citations omitted).
288. Id.
289. Id. ¶ 30, 945 P.2d at 965–66. Moreover, in applying state law to the claim of entrapment actually
presented, the Vallejos court contrasted the facts in the case with the facts in United States v. Diggs, 8 F.3d 1520
(10th Cir. 1993), noting the far more oppressive activity in the federal prosecution not warranting relief under
federal due process. Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 36–37, 945 P.2d at 967–68. The state court also rejected the
defendant’s claim on the merits under state due process. Id. ¶ 41, 945 P.2d at 969.
290. Id. ¶ 29, 945 P.2d at 965.
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determination that the defense is viewed from the perspective of the accused.291 In
contrast, an objective perspective requires the conduct of the government to be
viewed without regard to the subjective expectation or predisposition of the
accused. The court noted that “[i]n some states, and in the federal courts, subjective
entrapment is analyzed as a matter of legislative intent.”292
Instead of limiting the application of the defense to either subjective or objective
tests, the Vallejos court chose to apply an alternative test recognizing both
approaches, concluding:
We agree that all forms of entrapment constitute violations of due process. We
therefore conclude that principles of due process protected in Article II, Section
18 of the New Mexico Constitution are implicated whenever police exceed the
standards of proper investigation, create a likelihood that an ordinary person will
be ensnared, or actually ensnare such a person.293

Relying on a theory of objective entrapment, an accused may assert the defense as
a matter of law subject to resolution by pre-trial motion, permitting the trial court
to consider the evidence supporting the claim of outrageous behavior without the
issue of the impact of that behavior on the accused ever being submitted to the trier
of fact.294 This represents an important procedural option available to New Mexico
defendants attributable to the court’s expansive interpretation of the state
constitutional due process protection.
C. Procedural Issues in Relying on Existing State Constitutional Law
The development of state law affording more expansive protection of individual
rights, as well as the protection of rights afforded by consideration of both federal
and state law procedural guarantees, requires trial counsel to fully appreciate the
nature of the claim asserted and the proper use of existing precedent. In order to
provide representation that is “competent,” requiring that counsel exercise that
degree of “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation,”295 counsel must be prepared to rely on existing
precedent that offers relief for the client under either or both the state and Federal
Constitutions, state law, and procedural rules. Moreover, while the protection
afforded by state law only applies in state proceedings, counsel’s failure to preserve
claims based on state law analogs to federal constitutional protections, or
independent sources of state law, may serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance

291. The court gave an excellent explanation of subjective entrapment, explaining that the action of police
in selling heroin to an individual whom they knew to be an addict might result in acquittal by a jury convinced that
this behavior constituted something more than merely affording the accused an opportunity to commit the crime,
even though he “‘was already willing to commit the crime…before first being approached’ by the police.” Id. ¶ 34
n.11, 945 P.2d at 967 (citing State v. Sheetz, 113 N.M. 324, 328–29, 825 P.2d 614, 618–19 (Ct. App. 1991)).
292. Id. ¶ 32, 945 P.2d at 966–67.
293. Id.
294. Id. ¶ 34, 945 P.2d at 967. The court compared the procedure to that of suppression, where the
evidentiary hearing focuses on the conduct of the police or other government agents and the determination is made
on the basis of whether their conduct exceeded the proper bounds of their discretion.
295. Rule 16-101 NMRA.
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claim predicated on both state constitutional protection and the Sixth
Amendment.296
1. Preservation Rules
Preservation of state law grounds with respect to those protections previously
articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court does not require trial counsel to
argue a rationale for more expansive interpretation of state law than that required
when the claimed theory for relief has not already been recognized as affording
relief by the appellate courts. Further, if the defendant prevails on the state
constitutional claim in the trial court, the preservation rule is relaxed if the court’s
ruling is challenged by the State by interlocutory appeal. For instance, in State v.
Granville,297 the State contested the trial court’s finding that a state constitutional
violation had occurred by arguing that the defendant had failed to preserve error.298
The court of appeals observed that when the defendant bases his objection on
existing precedent there is no need for greater explanation of the claim than
normally required for preservation.299 The trial court ordered suppression on a state
constitutional claim arising from the claimed privacy interest of the accused in his
garbage.300 The State was required to take an interlocutory appeal, consequently
resulting in a more relaxed preservation requirement for this issue by the defendant
on appeal, than if the defendant had himself been in the posture of attacking the trial
court’s rejection of his state constitutional law claim.301 The rationale for the
difference in posture likely lies in the appellate court’s appreciation of the fact that
when the trial court rules for the accused in such a situation, it implicitly finds that
the trial court was clearly apprised of the nature of the claim and supporting theory.
On the other hand, if the accused fails to properly preserve error by thoroughly
arguing the basis for his claim, the trial court may simply not have had the requisite
information in order to make a fully informed judgment on its merits.
2. Concomitant Reliance on Federal Constitutional Protections
Even counsel thoroughly versed in decisions grounding more expansive views
of individual rights implicated in criminal prosecutions in the New Mexico
Constitution, state statutes, or procedural rules may hesitate at simply relying on
state precedent in support of their claims. Most commonly, it would seem
296. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374–76 (1986). In Kimmelman, the Court held that failure to
assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment seizure of evidence in state court, typically foreclosed from federal
habeas review under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), could still form the basis for an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim that would remain cognizable in a federal habeas action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382–83.
297. 2006-NMCA-098, 142 P.3d 933.
298. Id. ¶ 12, 142 P.3d at 937.
299. Id. ¶ 13, 142 P.3d at 937 (“When existing precedent construes a state constitutional provision as
providing broader protection than its federal counterpart, the preservation of the state constitutional claim requires
no more than preservation of any other claim for appellate review.”).
300. Id. ¶ 6, 142 P.3d at 936.
301. The court observed: “As the appellee, however, Defendant was not strictly required to preserve his
arguments; we affirm if the trial court decision was right for any reason, as long as the arguments in favor of
affirmance are not fact based such that it would be unfair to entertain them for the first time on appeal without
notice to the appellant.” Id. ¶ 12, 142 P.3d at 937.
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appropriate to always couch support for a privacy-based claim arising in the context
of a seizure or search in terms of the Fourth Amendment, as well as a more
expansive holding articulated under article II, section 10 of the state constitution.
The reason is that while counsel may have concluded that the precise situation
is controlled by existing state law precedent, if that determination is incorrect, the
federal claim is preserved for federal review. Although counsel may also believe
that favorable disposition by the United States Supreme Court would be unlikely on
the claim, in fact, the Court continues to consider unresolved Fourth Amendment
claims in favor of criminal defendants. For instance, in Georgia v. Randolph,302 the
Court held that if an individual who is physically present expressly refuses to give
consent to a search of his residence, then the consent given by another person who
might appear authorized to consent is constitutionally inadequate to validate the
search of the property and subsequent seizure of evidence.303 If the Fourth
Amendment-based claim for relief in a Randolph situation were preserved at the
time the decision issues, the defendant would be entitled to relief on the basis of
Randolph on appeal in the state courts while his case is pending, or in the United
States Supreme Court if the same claim were pending on certiorari when the
decision in Randolph was announced.304 A failure to preserve the federal
constitutional ground for the claim might result in default or forfeiture if, in fact,
counsel’s reliance on the state precedent proves to be in error, and a decision of the
United States Supreme Court ends up favoring the accused. In such a circumstance,
the failure to preserve the federal constitutional claim could well deprive the
defense of the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision because the New Mexico
appellate courts would not be under a burden to enforce a federal constitutional
decision in the absence of a preserved claim.305
However, if counsel does argue both federal constitutional and state law
protections, proper preservation of the state law-based claim for later purposes
requires that counsel obtain a ruling on the state law ground, rather than simply a
rejection of the Fourth Amendment theory for relief. The reason is that while the
interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation requires the courts to first
consider whether protection is afforded by the Federal Constitution, a failure to
obtain a ruling on the state law analog could result in a forfeiture of the state law
ground for relief, just as a failure to assert a state law analog may be deemed a
forfeiture.

302. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
303. Id. at 106.
304. The Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, predicated on the due process guarantee, provides that
decisions announcing “new” rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure apply to benefit all defendants whose
preserved claims remain pending on “direct appeal” at the time the decision announcing a new rule is issued.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 316 (1987). “New rules” are essentially interpretations or applications of
federal constitutionally protected rights that mark a break with existing precedent. If the Court’s decision is not one
dictated by prior decisions, “precedent,” then it is a “new” rule for purpose of Griffith’s retroactivity doctrine.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). “Direct appeal” for purposes of Griffith, includes the period for filing
or pendency of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The direct appeal is thus concluded with denial
of the petition for writ of certiorari or disposition of the claim when certiorari has been granted. Griffith, 479 U.S.
at 321 n.6.
305. See, e.g, Hinkston v. State, 10 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Ark. 2000).
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III. ARGUING FOR NEW INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF STATE
LAW THAT PROTECTS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
When counsel relies on a claim for more expansive relief than that provided for
by the Federal Constitution, or presumably, a claim for novel relief not previously
addressed as a matter of federal constitutional protection or state law, the
intellectual burden of persuasion is increased. Defense counsel must be prepared not
only to identify the provision of the state constitution or state law affording relief
on the facts, but if the federal analog has already been interpreted not to afford the
necessary protection on the facts, counsel must offer the trial court a rationale for
why state law provides greater protection for the client.
It is not altogether clear that when writing on a clean slate, counsel would be
required to offer an explanation that speculates on how the United States Supreme
Court would interpret the federal constitutional analog, but it seems likely that
counsel should be prepared to do so or risk failure of the claim. The reason is
simple: even in asserting a new claim or interpretation of a federally protected right,
counsel should advance an argument based on existing precedent that seeks to
extend the protections afforded by that existing precedent, arguing by analogy.
Additionally, if there is no controlling federal precedent, counsel should assert
both the federal and state grounds for protection because it is always possible that
the Supreme Court would grant relief on a new construction of federal
constitutional law, whereas the state court, writing on that same clean slate might
not. Failure to assert the federal claim would result in a disposition only on state
law grounds, barring review on certiorari by the Supreme Court.306
A. Preservation Rules
Counsel asserting a state law ground for greater protection of the client’s rights
than that afforded by the Federal Constitution must not only state the source for that
ground and develop a factual predicate for the claim,307 but also offer a theoretical
basis for the more expansive protection. In Gomez, the court expressly held:
However, when a party asserts a state constitutional right that has not been
interpreted differently than its federal analog, a party also must assert in the trial
court that the state constitutional provision at issue should be interpreted more
expansively than the federal counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the
state provision differently from the federal provision.308

306. See, e.g., Howell v. Mississippi, 543 U.S. 440, 443–44 (2005) (holding that failure to preserve claim
on federal constitutional grounds in state courts deprives Supreme Court of jurisdiction to consider claim on writ
of certiorari); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969).
307. In Gomez, for instance, the appellate court observed that trial counsel had developed a factual record
upon which the legal claim rested, providing the necessary foundation for assessing the claim on the merits, as well
as prejudice to the rights of the accused. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 932 P.2d 1, 9. The court
distinguished trial counsel’s care in developing the record with the absence of necessary supporting factual records
in State v. De Jesus-Santibanez, 119 N.M. 578, 580, 893 P.2d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 1995), and State v. Ramzy, 116
N.M. 748, 751, 867 P.2d 418, 421 (Ct. App. 1993), noting that in both “the opposing party was deprived of the
chance to develop facts relevant to the claim, in this case all relevant facts are present in the record to determine
the existence of exigent circumstances.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 932 P.2d at 9.
308. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23, 932 P.2d at 8; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶ 8, 166 P.3d 1106,
1109–10.
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A failure to properly preserve the claim by developing a theory for greater
protection for the client under state law than that provided by the Federal
Constitution results in a waiver of the state law claim so that the appellate court
only reviews the federal claim, even when counsel has stated reliance on the New
Mexico constitution in making the objection.309
As noted earlier, the trial court’s suppression order in Granville310 on a state
constitutional claim was based on the accused’s claimed privacy interest in his
garbage. The State’s position challenging the trial court’s decision on interlocutory
appeal resulted in the relaxation of the usual preservation requirement, thus
benefiting the defendant.311
Granville demonstrates why a party asserting a new claim under state law is
required to present the claim to the trial court, rather than simply asserting it as a
matter of fundamental error in the state appellate courts.312 The Granville court
noted that the importance of developing a factual basis for the claim and the context
of the claim—protection of the accused’s garbage from a search not under
warrant313—illustrate precisely the type of unique set of facts often relied upon by
the courts in their decisions. There, the court devoted extensive discussion of the
nature of garbage and its collection in concluding that under the state constitution,
an individual may retain an expectation of privacy in their garbage.314
B. Creative Approaches to New Substantive Claims
State courts have looked to a variety of devices for development of more
expansive protections afforded for criminal defendants than those provided by the
Federal Constitution. In Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in fact, noted
decisions from four other state courts that had expounded on the process of arguing
for these broader protections, essentially directing the state’s lawyers to consider
the contexts identified in those decisions that would suggest litigation strategies for
assertion of state constitutional claims.315 The Gomez court cited cases from the
New Jersey,316 New York,317 Pennsylvania,318 and Vermont319 high courts that

309. State v. Garcia, 2008-NMCA-044, ¶ 10, 182 P.3d 146, 149–50, rev’d, 2009-NMSC-046, available at
http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2009/09sc-046.pdf.
310. 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 2, 142 P.3d 933, 935.
311. See supra notes 297–301 and accompanying text.
312. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 16, 142 P.3d at 938 (“Based on the record, we conclude that the trial
court clearly had an opportunity to rule on the issue and was armed with the legal assertions and facts necessary
to do so.” (emphasis added)).
313. Id. ¶ 34, 142 P.3d at 944 (“We emphasize that this ruling does not preclude a search of an individual’s
garbage by law enforcement. We merely conclude that a search of an individual’s garbage must be supported by
probable cause and a warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist or another doctrine, such as plain view, negates
the individual’s expectation of privacy.”).
314. Id. ¶¶ 25–32, 142 P.3d at 941–43.
315. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23, 932 P.2d 1, 8 (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962–67 (N.J.
1982) (Handler, J., concurring); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 236–38 (Vt. 1985)).
316. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 962–67 (Handler, J., concurring).
317. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d at 560.
318. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
319. Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236–38.
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provide a fairly consistent framework for the development of state constitutional
law.
1. Justice Handler’s Framework for Analysis
The most comprehensive discussion of theoretical support for more expansive
reading of state constitutional protections noted by the Gomez court is found in
Justice Handler’s concurring opinion in the New Jersey case, State v. Hunt.320
Justice Handler argued that there are at least seven differing grounds for
interpretation of state constitutional provisions independent of federal constitutional
case law, supporting each with references to prior New Jersey decisions and
decisions from other jurisdictions. Often, these considerations overlap in terms of
theory or application, or provide alternative bases of support in interpretation of
state constitutional provisions. His framework, moreover, is reflected in the other
decisions cited in Gomez, and is based on the following grounds he identified.
a. Textual Language
Justice Handler first noted that different interpretations of constitutional values
between the federal and state charters may be predicated on comparison of different
wording and intended scope of protection implicated by language differences.321 A
difference in textual language was identified as a basis for distinguishing the scope
of protections afforded by federal and state constitutional provisions in the other
opinions cited in Gomez.322
An example of reliance on differences in textual language is demonstrated in the
Michigan Supreme Court’s view of a mandatory life sentence without possibility
of parole imposed on even first offenders convicted of certain drug trafficking
offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rather summarily rejected a claim that the
sentence violated the “cruel and unusual” punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment in People v. Harmelin.323 On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed,
deferring to the legislature’s judgment in proscribing sentences for serious offenses
in Harmelin v. Michigan.324 Following the Court’s disposition in Harmelin,
however, the state supreme court struck down the sentencing scheme in People v.
Bullock,325 this time predicating its holding on the state constitutional protection
against imposition of “cruel or unusual punishments.”326 The court explained: “In
the case of a divided United States Supreme Court decision, we may in some cases
find more persuasive, and choose to rely upon, the reasoning of the dissenting
justices of that Court, and not the majority, for purposes of interpreting our own
Michigan Constitution.”327

320. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 962 (Handler, J., concurring).
321. Id. at 965 (“A state constitution’s language may itself provide a basis for reaching a result different from
that which could be obtained under federal law.”).
322. See P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d at 560; Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895; Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236.
323. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
324. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), aff’g 440 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
325. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872–76 (Mich. 1992).
326. Id. at 870 n.8 (applying MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16).
327. Id. at 870.
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The Michigan court found that one rationale for interpreting state constitutional
provisions differently than the interpretation of a comparable provision in the
Federal Constitution by the United States Supreme Court involved examination of
the text itself. Here, the state court noted that the phrasing of the state constitution
in prohibiting “cruel or unusual” punishments, as opposed to “cruel and unusual”
punishments—the language of the Eighth Amendment—offered a basis for
distinguishing between the scope of protection contemplated by the two
documents.328 Moreover, the Bullock court noted that it had previously observed that
the precise language of the state constitutional provision suggested that some
punishments not necessarily cruel, such as incarceration, might still fall under the
prohibition of imposition of an unusual punishment, such as an unusually
oppressive length of imprisonment.329
b. Legislative History
Justice Handler next noted the use of legislative history as a means of
determining whether a state constitutional provision was intended to afford broader
protection of individual rights than that found in the comparable federal
constitutional provision.330 This is obviously particularly valuable when the textual
language in the two provisions is identical or nearly so.
An example of the use of legislative history as a vehicle for constitutional
interpretation in New Mexico is presented in City of Farmington v. Fawcett.331
There, the defendant complained in an obscenity prosecution that the free speech
guarantee included in the state constitution protected the content of publications
that were the subject of the municipal ordinance under which he was prosecuted.332
The text of the free speech guarantee in the New Mexico constitution provides, in
pertinent part: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”333
The court rejected the claim that obscenity is protected by the language of the
free speech guarantee in the state constitution.334 In so concluding, it engaged in a
historical analysis in an effort to determine whether the original intent reflected in
section 17 was to make freedom of expression absolute under state law, tracing the
history from the government of General Kearny, established with the occupation of
Santa Fe during the Mexican War in 1846.335 It traced the history of the free speech
protection through the constitutional history of the territory and state, ultimately

328. Id. at 872. The court noted that in People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 1991), it had observed
that a “significant textual difference…between parallel provisions of the state and federal constitutions may
constitute a ‘compelling reason’ for a different and broader interpretation of the state provision.” Bullock, 485
N.W.2d at 872.
329. Id. (citing People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972)).
330. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring). Resort to legislative history was
also mentioned in People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 564 (N.Y. 1986), and Commonwealth v. Edmunds,
586 A.2d 887, 895–99 (Pa. 1991).
331. 114 N.M. 537, 843 P.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1992).
332. Id. at 540, 843 P.2d at 842.
333. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17.
334. Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 541–42, 843 P.2d at 843–44.
335. Id. at 542, 843 P.2d at 844.
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rejecting the argument that the state constitution of 1910 protected obscenity.336
While finding that the constitutional history of the free speech protection was not
conclusive, the court concluded that the history “augur[ed] in favor of finding that
the language of Article II, Section 17, was not intended to preclude the regulation
of obscenity as an abuse of free speech.”337 In Fawcett, the New Mexico court
engaged in the type of historical analysis suggested by Justice Handler in his
suggested framework for interpretation of state constitutional protections.
c. Preexisting State Law
Third, Justice Handler suggested reliance on pre-existing case law in the
jurisdiction.338 This approach was followed by the New Mexico court in rejecting
Illinois v. Gates in favor of continued reliance on the Aguilar/Spinelli test339 in State
v. Cordova.340 Similarly, the New York court in People v. P.J. Video, Inc.
characterized this line of analysis as “noninterpretive,” meaning that it does not
involve an attempt to discern a more expansive interpretation of constitutional
language by reference to text or history, but by looking to the application of the
right in prior decisions of the courts. The court explained: “[N]oninterpretive
review proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental
fairness. A noninterpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any
preexisting State statutory or common law defining the scope of the individual right
in question.”341
d. Structural Differences
Next, Justice Handler argued that structural differences between the federal and
state constitutional approaches to governmental authority may provide a rational
basis for differentiating between the scope of protections afforded under the
different documents. He argued, for example, that this type of structural difference
can be discerned from the intent of the Federal Constitution to allocate specific
authority to the national government, while the New Jersey Constitution, serves to
limit the authority of the state government while reserving power for the people.342
Consequently, in the example he provides, of the protection afforded by the First
Amendment and comparable provision of the state constitution, the former is
couched in terms of an express limitation on the power of the national government
to burden free speech, while the state provision affirmatively protects individual

336. Id. at 543, 843 P.2d at 845.
337. Id. at 543–44, 843 P.2d at 845–46.
338. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
339. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text.
340. 109 N.M. 211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (“We conclude that our present court rules better effectuate
the principles behind Article II, Section 10 of our Constitution than does the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test set
out in Gates.”).
341. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986) (citing Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of
State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1001 (1985)). It is also the approach advocated later in this article with
respect to reassertion of the state courts’ traditional characterization of the confrontation right as embracing,
virtually by necessity, the right to cross-examination. See infra Part III.C.3.
342. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965–66 (Handler, J., concurring).
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speech:343 “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects.…”344
A similar distinction can be drawn between the protection accorded exercise of
religious belief by the First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”345—and the
express language of the New Mexico constitution. The state charter provides:
Every man shall be free to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and no person shall ever be molested or denied any civil or political
right or privilege on account of his religious opinion or mode of religious
worship. No person shall be required to attend any place of worship or support
any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any preference be given by law to
any religious denomination or mode of worship.346

The state constitutional protection of religious freedom is not couched in terms of
limitation on the authority of the state, but rather, as Justice Handler might observe,
in terms of the right of the individual to “worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience.”
e. Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern
The fifth proposition cited by Justice Handler involves the recognition of matters
of particular local concern, such as the jurisdiction’s management of its court
system. For example, he noted that New Jersey had adopted a broader standing
doctrine for challenges to seizures and searches than that afforded federal litigants
raising Fourth Amendment claims.347 He explained that the court expanded the
standing rule based on local considerations: “We felt free to do so because that
question implicated the management of our own court system, which is of peculiarly
local concern. It also reflected a strong state policy in favor of access to our courts
and liberalized standing to vindicate legal claims.”348
The New Mexico Supreme Court took essentially this same position in Montoya
v. Ulibarri,349 where the court held that a petitioner asserting and proving a claim
of actual innocence in the state post-conviction process is entitled to relief from his
conviction.350 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has thus far rejected
claims that actual innocence warrants relief from the conviction as a matter of
343. Id. at 966 n.2 (quoting the First Amendment: “‘Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom
of speech’” (citation omitted)).
344. N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 6. See also discussion of New Mexico constitution free speech clause, supra Part
III.B.1.b.
345. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
346. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
347. For example, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978),
the Court held that only an individual having a personal privacy interest in the place or thing to be searched has
standing to object to the seizure as illegal.
348. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
349. 2007-NMSC-035, 163 P.3d 476. For a discussion of Montoya v. Ulibarri see supra Part II.B.2.
350. The New Mexico constitution expressly recognizes due process and equal protection concepts that
generally parallel those afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. The state constitutional provision reads: “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws. Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.” N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 18.
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federal due process.351 Because the petitioner in Montoya sought relief under both
the state and Federal constitutions, the court relied on the interstitial analytical
approach in responding to the claims,352 explaining: “[W]e identify both structural
differences between our state government and the federal government as well as
distinctive state characteristics that warrant a departure from the federal rule not to
hear the freestanding innocence claims of habeas petitioners.”353
The Montoya court expressly relied on two distinct factors identified by Justice
Handler in Hunt, structural differences between the state and federal governments354
and distinctive characteristics of the state.355 Its decision reflects both its
appreciation that within the federal system, the Supreme Court restricted federal
habeas relief to claims predicated on violations of federally protected rights,
essentially holding that consideration of claims of actual innocence not tied to
violations of procedural rights would result in unwarranted intrusion into state
judicial and executive clemency processes.356 With regard to structural differences,
the Montoya court noted that as a state court, it was not bound by principles of
federalism in its approach to state habeas corpus remedies. Justice Maes wrote:
“Rather than being concerned with principles of federalism, the New Mexico
Constitution is obligated to protect our State’s sovereignty. Intrinsic within state
sovereignty is an interest protecting the credibility of the state judiciary.”357
Instead of being confined to consideration only of procedural claims dictated by
principles of federalism, the Montoya court instead concluded that New Mexico, as
a matter of distinctive character of the state, would not accept incarceration of an
innocent defendant because of its threat to the integrity of jury verdicts and the
state’s court system. Justice Maes explained: “[I]n view of our state interest in
insuring accuracy and the superior ability of our state courts to make accurate
factual findings, we find sufficient reason to depart from the federal decision not to
recognize freestanding innocence claims brought by habeas petitioners.”358
Moreover, the court concluded that the incarceration of an innocent defendant
would violate both the due process protection359 and prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment360 contained in article II, sections 13 and 18 of the state
constitution.361 Consequently, the court proceeded to develop the appropriate test
for determination of claims of actual innocence challenging state court convictions
on the merits,362 eventually rejecting Montoya’s claim.363 Because the Supreme

351. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
352. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 14, 163 P.3d at 481.
353. Id. ¶ 19, 163 P.3d at 482–83.
354. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 163 P.3d at 483; State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956–66 (N.J. 1982) (Hander, J.,
concurring).
355. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 23–24, 163 P.3d at 483–84; Hunt, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
356. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401, 415–17.
357. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 21, 163 P.3d at 483.
358. Id.
359. Id. ¶ 23, 163 P.3d at 484.
360. Id. ¶ 24, 163 P.3d at 484.
361. N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 13, 18.
362. Montoya, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 26–33, 163 P.3d at 485–87.
363. Id. ¶¶ 33–36, 163 P.3d at 487–88.
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Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional protections in Herrera v. Collins
rejected—though equivocally364—claims that Herrera’s conviction would violate
federal law and warrant habeas relief, the Montoya court’s application of state
constitutional law clearly represents more expansive protection for New Mexico
defendants petitioning state, rather than federal courts for relief from their
convictions.
f. State Traditions
Sixth, Justice Handler noted that a state court might interpret a state
constitutional protection more broadly than the interpretation afforded the
comparable federal constitutional provision based on state tradition. He noted, for
instance, that New Jersey requires a higher degree of performance by counsel in
criminal cases than that imposed by the Sixth Amendment, based upon the state’s
“firm policy regarding the proper role for attorneys in criminal trials.”365
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Breit366 reflects something
of the same kind of concern for state tradition in the conduct of criminal trials. In
Breit the court extended due process and double jeopardy protections beyond that
afforded defendants under the Fifth Amendment decision in Oregon v. Kennedy367
in protecting the right to fair trial. In Kennedy, the Court held that where mistrial is
granted on motion of the defendant, retrial is barred when the mistrial motion itself
is the result of the prosecution “goading” the defense into moving for mistrial based
on repeated acts of misconduct.368 Breit was convicted in a second trial after the trial
court granted a motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct following
his conviction.369 Citing prior New Mexico case law, the Breit court noted “[i]n
New Mexico, the rule barring reprosecution applies in those situations in which ‘the
prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the purpose of precipitating a motion for
a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon retrial, or subjecting the
defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of successive trials.’”370 The court
noted that under the federal standard imposed in Kennedy, Breit’s retrial following
a first trial tainted by prosecutorial misconduct would not have been barred by
double jeopardy. The state court distanced itself from the limitation imposed in
364. The Court clearly rejected Herrera’s claim, but both the majority, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417
(1993), and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, concurring, id. at 426 (O’Connor, J., concurring), suggested that a
more credible claim of actual innocence than that advanced by Herrera might require relief from execution. Justice
White conceded that a viable claim might exist if the petitioner could show that no rational jury would have
convicted him on the evidence presented based on application of the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 429 (White,
J., concurring).
365. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring). For discussion of the New
Mexico constitutional guarantee of effective assistance and how it might expand upon the Sixth Amendment
protection, see infra Part III.C.4.
366. 1996-NMSC-067, 930 P.2d 792.
367. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
368. Id. at 679.
369. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 1, 930 P.2d at 794. Breit’s motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy
grounds was granted by the trial court, but the court of appeals reversed on the state’s appeal from the dismissal
order. The supreme court denied certiorari to review the court of appeals decision. Breit v. State, 113 N.M. 1, 820
P.2d 435 (1991). He was then retried and convicted a second time. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 7, 930 P.2d at 795.
370. Id. ¶ 2, 930 P.2d at 794 (citing State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 757, 617 P.2d 142, 146 (1980)). Day was
decided four years after Oregon v. Kennedy.
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Kennedy that the termination of the first trial must have resulted from the defense
being goaded into moving for mistrial and offered a more expansive interpretation371
of the protection afforded by the double jeopardy guarantee under the state
constitution.372
The court noted that it was not bound by the federal standard articulated in
Kennedy in formulating its state constitutional test.373 Consequently, it articulated
a broader protection under the state constitution for prior jeopardy claims when
conviction has been tainted by extreme misconduct, explaining: “as a general
principle, we need not, in interpreting the provisions of our State Constitution,
adopt the standard that is applicable to the comparable federal provision.”374 Thus,
the Breit court concluded, in applying the state constitutional standard to his claim:
[S]o pervasive and outrageous was the misconduct of the prosecutor in Breit’s
first trial that we are compelled to join other states in concluding that the narrow
Kennedy rule based solely on prosecutorial intent does not adequately protect
double-jeopardy interests. We do not overrule Day in this opinion. Rather, we
interpret Day to be describing instances of misconduct in which the prosecutor
acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal on appeal.
Under this standard, the reprosecution of Breit is barred.375

Breit arguably reflects precisely the type of concern for state attitudes toward the
administration of the criminal justice system that may warrant a departure from
federal precedent in interpreting comparable state constitutional protections to fit
with local standards. Moreover, it is particularly important in emphasizing the
extent to which precedent from other jurisdictions, also reflecting state attitudes,
may serve to inform the New Mexico court regarding alternative approaches to the
resolution of constitutional issues.
g. Public Attitudes
Finally, the seventh ground supporting more expansive protection afforded by
state constitutional provisions than that recognized under the Federal Constitution
would lie in general attitudes held by the public in the jurisdiction. Justice Handler
noted that New Jersey had not applied this theory in evaluating protection afforded
under the state constitution, but cited to other jurisdictions that had applied this
theory.376 New Mexico also appears to have done so.
In the extradition litigation involving Timothy Reed, a fugitive from Ohio
claiming that his return to the Ohio prison system would result in his murder, the
New Mexico courts essentially took the position that the state provided sanctuary

371. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶¶ 32–36, 930 P.2d at 803–04. The court explained, “some state courts have
adopted a more encompassing standard for the double-jeopardy clauses of their state constitutions than Kennedy
would allow for the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. ¶ 24, 930 P.2d at 800. It also engaged in a
lengthy examination of decisions from other jurisdictions applying more protective standards for double jeopardy
claims than Kennedy. Id. ¶¶ 19–23, 28–31, 930 P.2d at 798–800, 802–03.
372. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
373. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 27, 930 P.2d at 801.
374. Id.
375. Id. ¶ 3, 930 P.2d at 795.
376. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966–67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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for those who were subject to repression or reprisal if extradited.377 It relied on the
state constitution as general authority for the proposition that the state affords
greater protection for those seeking relief from oppression, explaining:
In addition to our own Bill of Rights, the New Mexico Constitution offers unique
protections that are not duplicated by its federal counterpart. We do not construe
any provision of the federal constitution to require a New Mexico court to ignore
its own constitutional guarantees of life and liberty and safety.378

Because Reed was an activist for prison reform and had written extensively about
prison conditions in Ohio, the state district court found that his fear of unlawful
retaliation was well-founded.379 The state supreme court held that Reed was not
“fugitive” subject to mandatory extradition,380 relying on the fact that the New
Mexico version381 of the Uniform Extradition Act,382 unlike the federal statute,383
expressly guarantees “due process and habeas corpus rights of the defendant.” 384
The court rejected a simplistic inquiry into whether Reed was present in New
Mexico while being sought by Ohio in understanding the question of his status as
a “fugitive,” observing “if the courts of the asylum state are limited to so narrow a
definition of ‘fugitive from justice,’ then any argument on the fugitivity element
would be meaningless.”385
Concluding that the requirement that mandatory extradition be based on the
accused’s status as a “fugitive,”386 the state supreme court rejected the simplistic
analysis it had criticized and upheld the district court’s denial of extradition.387
Justice Franchini wrote for the majority: “In this case, we conclude that, because
he was forced by the conduct of government officials to flee the State of Ohio,
Reed’s mere presence in New Mexico does not render him a fugitive from
justice.”388 He then amplified the majority’s position:
The focus of our analysis is whether Reed is a “fugitive from justice”; in other
words, whether he seeks to avoid the maintenance and administration of what is
just. The facts demonstrate conclusively that Ohio’s conduct toward Reed was
not just. Reed is thus not a fugitive from justice. Rather, he is a refugee from
injustice.389

377. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d, 524 U.S. 151 (1998).
378. Id. ¶ 93, 947 P.2d at 104–05.
379. Reed v. Ortiz, No. 94-1 CR Misc., 1995 WL 118952, *6–8 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 1995), aff’d, 1997-NMSC055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d, 524 U.S. 151 (1998). The state supreme court relied on the trial court’s findings in holding
that Reed was not a “fugitive” required to be extradited. Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 3–33, 947 P.2d at 89–93.
380. Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 44, 947 P.2d at 95.
381. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-4-1 to -30 (1937).
382. Unif. Criminal Extradition Act § 2, 11 U.L.A. 113 (1995).
383. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006).
384. Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 61, 947 P.2d at 98.
385. Id. ¶ 82, 947 P.2d at 102.
386. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978).
387. Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 83, 947 P.2d at 102 (“This pointless determination cannot logically be the
limit of the Doran fugitivity analysis.”).
388. Id. ¶ 84, 947 P.2d at 103.
389. Id. ¶ 86, 947 P.2d at 103.
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Perhaps concerned that the court would be viewed as unduly resistant to the normal
process of constitutionally mandated extradition, Justice Franchini further explained
why the court found it necessary to contradict usual process, writing:
Throughout this opinion we have emphasized that, in the context of extradition
law, Reed’s situation is unique. There is no controlling authority that addresses
all of the peculiar circumstances of this case. We have closely studied and sought
guidance from the many judicial opinions and accepted canons of extradition
law. Nevertheless, a mechanical reading of this precedent would overlook
important elements of Reed’s case and militate the intolerable result of sending
him back to face death or great bodily harm. Whatever a court’s mandate may
be under extradition law, it is clearly not to send a defendant back to face such
a fate.390

He then explained that Reed was subject to the protection of New Mexico
authorities by the state constitution:
The New Mexico Constitution requires that we grant Reed’s writ of habeas
corpus. Reed faced the deprivation of his life without due process of law if he
had remained in Ohio. The New Mexico Constitution cannot tolerate such an
outcome. Moreover, Reed was precluded from seeking safety in Ohio. The
deprivation of his life would have been carried out under color of state law and
Reed was denied any legal recourse against this deprivation. He fled to New
Mexico for the express purpose of finding safety. For this reason, Reed properly
comes under the protection of Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico
Constitution which guarantees the right “of seeking and obtaining safety.” Reed
did not flee from justice. He sought refuge from injustice.391

Despite the state supreme court’s best efforts on Reed’s behalf, the United States
Supreme Court disagreed and summarily reversed the state court decision in a per
curiam order.392 Characterizing Reed’s allegations as “serious charges,”393 and
accepting the state court’s determination that the charges were credible, the Court
nonetheless ruled “this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried in the
asylum State,” noting that in “case after case” it had held that claims arising from
the actions of the demanding state had to be tried in the courts of the demanding
state.394
Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly noted a “sanctuary” right claimed under
the state constitution: “The Supreme Court of New Mexico also held that the New
Mexico Constitution’s provision guaranteeing the right ‘of seeking and obtaining
safety’ prevailed over the State’s duty under Article IV of the United States
Constitution.”395 But it rejected the notion that the state constitutional protection

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. ¶ 106, 947 P.2d at 108.
Id. ¶ 124, 947 P.2d at 112 (citation omitted).
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 155 (1998).
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154.
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could override the mandatory “commands of the Extradition Clause”396 of the
federal constitution.397
Although the state court’s assertion of local public policy values failed in Reed,
the approach taken reflects the type of policy concern unique to the state that may
warrant more expansive protections for individual rights under the state constitution
than afforded by the national charter.398 The New York court in P.J. Video noted the
same ground for examining state constitutional protections, citing “distinctive
attitudes of the State citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the
individual right.”399 Similarly, the Pennsylvania court in Edmunds noted that it is
appropriate to take into account “policy considerations, including unique issues of
state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania
jurisprudence.”400
Despite the comprehensive theoretical approach taken by Justice Handler, his
observations are certainly not exclusive. Neither is his framework exhaustive. But
it certainly provides an important starting point for state constitutional interpretation
and proved compelling for the New Mexico court in Gomez.
2. Factors Critical to New Mexico Constitutional Decision Making
In considering how to frame arguments for more expansive interpretation of New
Mexico state constitutional provisions to those afforded by comparable federal
constitutional guarantees, defense counsel should consider not only the framework
articulated by Justice Handler identifying general factors warranting differing
interpretation of rights, but also look to factors peculiar to New Mexico, as well. In
State v. Granville, for instance, the court examined the claim that an individual’s
garbage was subject to privacy protection by considering “distinct state
characteristics,” noting that: “When interpreting Article II, Section 10, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has emphasized its strong belief in the protection of
individual privacy.”401
In considering those factors that make New Mexico distinctive, counsel should
look beyond the legal aspects of Justice Handler’s framework for state
constitutional law analysis.402 In particular, counsel should consider the role of the
state’s multi-cultural demographic makeup in influencing public attitudes and
policies. This makeup includes the recognition that New Mexico is, at a minimum,
a bilingual state in terms of actual language usage. It is also a border state, resulting
in significant interaction with a population not only from outside its state borders,
396. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
397. Reed, 524 U.S. at 154.
398. The Supreme Court’s ultimate rejection of the state court’s reasoning reflects, in part, the tensions that
often mark different perspectives between states, evident in their traditions and public values, from a national
perspective, ranging from contrary positions over slavery that led to the Civil War to the disputed authority of states
to legalize medical use of marihuana.
399. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986).
400. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
401. 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 19, 142 P.3d 933, 939 (citing State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 150 n.6, 870 P.2d
103, 112).
402. Three factors may influence judicial interpretation of the state constitution: (1) New Mexico is a
relatively “new” state, having achieved statehood in 1912; (2) it is a “tri-cultural” state; and (3) it is a border state.
See Memorandum from N.M. Pub. Defender Dep’t, Appellate Division (2008, revised) (copy on file with author).
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but across the national border with Mexico. Consequently, it is subject to influences
not only from Mexico, but other Latin American nations that press toward the
United States border in terms of population shifts and political and social traditions.
Further, in many respects, the state remains rural and agricultural.
At the same time, there is a significant historical relationship between the state
government of New Mexico and the Native American tribal governments that
operate simultaneously within the state’s borders. This often creates interesting
questions of joint and separate sovereignty as a consequence of their unique
relationship within the national federal governmental structure.403
These demographic features are not entirely unique among the states, but they
certainly differentiate the cultural contexts in which the state’s legal institutions and
law operates from the majority of other American states. Further, the interaction of
the different cultures contributes to recognition of significant tolerance for disparate
cultural and social traditions, creating in a real sense, a more liberal popular
perspective in social affairs. This liberality may also be seen in terms of tolerance
that has attracted artists404 and intellectuals405 who have shaped an important

403. For example, see State v. Harrison, 2008-NMCA-107, 190 P.3d 1146, where the court of appeals
considered the legality of an arrest made on the Navajo reservation by a state police officer who was not crosscommissioned as an officer with authority to arrest on Navajo land, but who followed the accused onto the
reservation after observing him drive over twenty miles in excess of the speed limit on a state road. Id. ¶ 2, 190 P.3d
at 1147. The court upheld the arrest, noting that the officer had acted legally. Id. ¶ 9, 190 P.3d at 1148. The court’s
concern for the relationship between Navajo and state authority was evident in its concluding paragraph:
We conclude this opinion by noting that Officer Charley scrupulously respected Navajo Nation
sovereignty. Officer Charley recognized the limits of his authority and did not arrest Defendant.
After concluding that Defendant was driving while intoxicated, Officer Charley was faced with
a predicament because he recognized he had no authority to arrest Defendant and because no
Navajo police officers were available. Rather than allowing a suspected drunk driver to get back
into his vehicle and possibly injure or kill people, Officer Charley allowed Defendant the
opportunity to try getting someone else to give him a ride. Learning that no ride was available,
Officer Charley allowed Defendant to leave the scene walking. There was no injury to the
sovereignty of the Navajo Nation.
Id. ¶ 15, 190 P.3d at 1150.
404. New Mexico has traditionally been uniquely situated to attract visual artists, reflected in the creation
of the Taos and Santa Fe artists colonies. See, e.g., ARRELL MORGAN GIBSON, THE SANTA FE AND TAOS COLONIES:
AGE OF THE MUSES, 1900–1942 (Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1983); EDNA ROBERTSON & SARAH NESTON, ARTISTS
OF THE CANYONS AND CAMINOS: SANTA FE, THE EARLY YEARS (Ancient City Press 1996); SHERRY CLAYTON
TAGGETT & TED SCHWARTZ, PAINTBRUSHES AND PISTOLS: HOW THE TAOS ARTISTS SOLD THE WEST (John Muir
Publications 1990) (histories of development and impact of Taos and Santa Fe artists colonies). The greatest
American representational painter of the 20th century, Georgia O’Keeffe, began painting in New Mexico in the late
1920s, first visiting during the summers, later moving to Abiquiu in the late 1940s, where she spent the greater part
of her remaining productive career. For her reflections, see GEORGIA O’KEEFFE, GEORGIA O’KEEFFE (Viking Press
1976). Expansion of artistic activity in Albuquerque, in part centered at the University of New Mexico, see Tisha
Blankenship, Jonson Gallery at UNM, 11 THE COLLECTOR’S GUIDE TO THE ALBUQUERQUE METRO AREA,
available at http://www.collectorsguide.com/ab/abfa20.shtml (last visited May 7, 2009) (discussing work and
career of Raymond Jonson, long-time faculty member in the University of New Mexico Art Department and
founder of the modernist Transcendental Painting Group), was evidenced by the relocation of the Tamarind
[Lithography] Institute from Los Angeles to Albuquerque in the 1960s. For a brief history of the Tamarind Institute,
see Clinton Adams, An Informed Energy: Lithography and Tamarind, 1 GRAPHEION (Spring 1997), available at
http://tamarind.unm.edu/adams.html (last visited May 1, 2009). See also CLINTON ADAMS, PRINTMAKING IN NEW
MEXICO, 1880–1990 (Univ. of New Mexico Press 1991) (history of printmaking in the state).
405. For instance, the Manhattan Project of World War II, brought an influence of nationally and
internationally famous scientists and engineers to Los Alamos for the development of atomic weapons. See GERALD
D. NASH, THE AMERICAN WEST TRANSFORMED: THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 163–65 (Indiana Univ.
Press 1985) (noting the impact of influx of American and émigré scientists on Los Alamos to work on the
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aesthetic appreciation common to differing elements of New Mexican society.
Similarly, other important institutions, such as the Catholic Church and its
significant presence and history in New Mexico, also shape the state’s tri-cultural
perspective.406
As a disclaimer, while both the Pennsylvania407 and Vermont408 courts noted that
an important consideration in the development of state constitutional law is the
treatment of similar questions by other jurisdictions, the existence of foreign
precedents alone is typically likely to be insufficient to justify an interpretation of
the state constitution in a manner more expansive than that of comparable federal
constitutional provisions. The New Mexico courts have evidenced significant
interest in examining authority from other jurisdictions in considering arguments
supporting expansive interpretation of the state constitution, but do not seem to
have approached the task because of the existence of these decisions.409 Rather, they
are viewed as support for independent analysis undertaken by the New Mexico
courts.410

Manhattan Project in World War II). The continuing influence of nuclear science in the state’s intellectual makeup
is still reflected in the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. See Sue Major Holmes, Energy Secretary
Visits Sandia Lab, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, April 10, 2009, available at http://www.lcsunnews.com/dona_ana_news/ci_12114172 (last visited May 1, 2009) (“Many scientists came to one of the weapons
labs—Sandia and Los Alamos in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore in California—to work in esoteric areas,
[U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven] Chu said. But as they matured in what he called ‘the natural life cycle of a
scientist,’ they realized they also wanted their work to have an impact on the real world.”).
406. See generally PAUL HORGAN, THE HEROIC TRIAD: BACKGROUNDS OF OUR THREE SOUTHWESTERN
CULTURES (Holt, Rinehart, Winston 1970) (analyzing cultural influences and interactions of Native-American,
Spanish/Mexican American, and Anglo cultures on development of New Mexico history).
407. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (suggesting reliance on related case-law
from other states).
408. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 1985) (suggesting extrapolating from approaches or holdings
in other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions).
409. For instance in State v. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, 964 P.2d 72, the court rejected arguments that
New Mexico should revise its approach to trial court comment on the credibility of witnesses by instructing jurors
that testimony of accomplices should be viewed with suspicion. Id. ¶ 9, 964 P.2d at 76. The defendant argued that
instruction was warranted as a matter of federal due process and relied on practices in other jurisdictions. Id. ¶ 10,
964 P.2d at 76. The court concluded that there was no requirement for such instruction as a matter of due process,
id. ¶ 11, 964 P.2d at 77, confirmed the position previously taken under state law restricting the authority of trial
judges to comment on evidence, id. ¶¶ 13–14, 964 P.2d at 77–78, and noted, but did not accept, conflicting
positions taken by courts in other states, id. ¶¶ 16–17, 964 P.2d at 78–79.
410. See State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 435–36, 863 P.2d 1052, 1056–57 (1993), where the court
explained:
We reiterate that in exercising our constitutional duty to interpret the organic laws of this state,
we independently analyze the New Mexico constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In so doing, we seek guidance from decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the federal search and seizure provision, from the decisions of courts
of our sister states interpreting their correlative state constitutional guarantees, and from the
common law. However, when this Court cites federal opinions, or opinions from courts of sister
states, in interpreting a New Mexico constitutional provision we do so not because we consider
ourselves bound to do so by our understanding of federal or state doctrines, but because we find
the views expressed persuasive and because we recognize the responsibility of state courts to
preserve national uniformity in development and application of fundamental rights guaranteed
by our state and federal constitutions.
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C. Areas for Exploration of Expanded State Constitutional Protections
New Mexico trial counsel considering preservation of state constitutional claims
should think creatively about the possibilities for obtaining favorable treatment of
arguments for more expansive protections than those afforded under comparable
federal constitutional provisions. The willingness of the state courts to consider
novel arguments, particularly with regard to privacy and due process issues should
encourage counsel to develop approaches to other traditional sources of
constitutional protections for the benefit of their clients. The following discussions
address areas of potential interest in future litigation.
1. Additional Expansion of the Privacy Protection
Even given the expansive protections afforded New Mexico defendants by prior
decisions interpreting the protection afforded by the state constitution, there will
likely always be arguments that can be advanced for even broader protection than
afforded under the Fourth Amendment. The starting point for expanding upon
existing interpretations should likely be the court’s expression in State v. Gutierrez:
“Article II, Section 10 [of the New Mexico Constitution] expresses the fundamental
notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.”411
Counsel arguing for expansion should undoubtedly always note in their positions
at trial that the state’s jurisprudential history unequivocally demonstrates a
commitment to examine novel claims regarding protections of personal autonomy
and privacy. The expansion of protections afforded under the state constitution has
taken place, moreover, without any substantively significant difference in language
between the text of article II, section 10 and the Fourth Amendment.412 Given the
fact that the state constitutional provision does not clearly support a more expanded
view of personal autonomy and privacy, the development of the New Mexico
analog to the Fourth Amendment must be attributed to the independence of the
state’s appellate courts in analyzing factors warranting the more expansive
interpretation, such as the state’s cultural traditions, geography, and social structure.
In light of the supreme court’s own reliance on case law from other states in
developing its rationale for development of New Mexico constitutional law,413
counsel should be prepared to use favorable decisions from other states in support
of a claim that further expansion of the state constitutional privacy protection is
warranted. For example, Montana recently departed from federal precedent in State
v. Goetz,414 holding that the privacy guarantee contained in the state constitution
prohibits the recording of conversations between a suspect and undercover drug
agent or informant without a warrant.415 The court held that the state constitution
411. Id. at 444, 863 P.2d at 1065.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 118–19. The wording of the two provisions is comparable, with
structural and stylistic differences in phrasing.
413. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23 n.3, 932 P.2d 1, 8.
414. 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
415. Id. at 504. The Goetz court recognized its own prior conflicting decisions in resolving the issue. Id. at
494. In State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984), the court had held that the warrantless electronic monitoring and
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provided broader protection for personal privacy than that recognized under the
United States Constitution, rejecting the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. White.416
Or, counsel might consider reliance on the Arkansas decision in Griffin v.
State,417 where the court held that nighttime incursions on a defendant’s curtilage
are illegal under the Arkansas constitution.418 New Mexico is a rural state, like
Arkansas, and that fact may warrant a greater protection of a homeowner’s
curtilage.
2. Waiver of Rights, Self-incrimination
There is some potential for development of independent state constitutional
protection relating to the waiver of a defendant’s rights, particularly the rights
subject to advice pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.419 In determining whether a
suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to remain silent or to
assistance of counsel,420 the Supreme Court has been relatively deferential to police
in terms of their interpretation of the suspect’s understanding of the rights that they
have waived when a statement elicited as a result of interrogation is challenged
under Miranda. For instance, in Davis v. United States,421 the Court held that unless
a suspect makes an unequivocal request for counsel422 an officer’s perception that
the suspect, in fact, intends to waive counsel and talk to the officer is controlling on

recording of the defendant’s conversations with an undercover law enforcement officer violated article II, sections
10 and 11 of the Montana constitution, even though the undercover officer consented to the monitoring. The State
relied on a subsequent decision, State v. Brown, 755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988), in which the supreme court had held
that electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with one’s consent, did not constitute a search
subject to the search warrant requirement.
416. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The Goetz court observed that its prior discussion of the state constitutional
protection in Brown had paralleled the Supreme Court’s analysis in White. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 496. The Goetz
majority explained:
[O]ur resolution of [Brown] merely paralleled federal jurisprudence on the subject and failed
to properly analyze the greater rights guaranteed by Montana’s Constitution. Stated differently,
having stated without equivocation that the Montana Constitution expressly provides more
privacy protection than that inferred from the United States Constitution—with the
corresponding obligation to provide an independent analysis under the Montana
Constitution—we failed to follow through.
191 P.3d at 496 (citing Brown, 755 P.2d at 1370–71).
Justice Morris, concurring and dissenting in Goetz, observed that the West Virginia court had already
rejected the Supreme Court’s analysis in White, in State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 2007), applying the
West Virginia Constitution. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 508 (Morris, J., concurring and dissenting). However, he noted that
in Mullens, the court distinguished between an invasion of the privacy of the home in the recording of a
conversation from the recording of a conversation occurring outside the home, as in a vehicle, where the
expectation of privacy is diminished. Id.
417. 67 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Ark. 2002).
418. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15.
419. 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
420. The key test is whether the accused can make a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of rights. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). In Aguilar v. State, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178 (1988), the court held that the
State had failed to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights where the defendant had a history of
hospitalization for mental illness and suffered from subnormal intelligence. See id. at 799, 751 P.2d at 179. The
court also noted that the intelligence test establishing his level of functioning was also questionable because it was
conducted in English, while his primary language was Spanish. See id. at 804, 751 P.2d at 184.
421. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
422. Id. at 459, 461–62.
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the factual issue of the suspect’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.423 In contrast, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has explained that in reviewing a challenge to the claimed waiver
of rights, it will look to “the totality of the circumstances and the particular facts
surrounding each case, including consideration of the mental and physical
condition, background, experience and conduct of the accused.”424 This test, more
comprehensive than the Supreme Court’s test in Davis,425—which depended almost
exclusively on the officer’s assessment of the suspect’s waiver of rights—was
applied in the context of the claimed violation of Fifth Amendment rights in State
v. Barrera.426 There, the issue focused on the suspect’s comprehension of English
and the court concluded that the warnings were adequate because they were given
orally and in writing in both English and Spanish.427
The most obvious concern for New Mexico defendants with regard to whether
waivers of rights are knowingly and intelligently made is the potential for
misunderstanding due to varying degrees in language proficiency. New Mexico
cases demonstrate a rather consistent regard by law enforcement officers that
warnings are given in both English and Spanish in an effort either to ensure that
waivers are properly made prior to interrogation or to simply provide a record for
response to objections in the pre-trial process.428 But, this is not necessarily the case,
as then-Judge Bosson noted in his concurrence in State v. Castillo-Sanchez.429 He
observed:
I also note my reservation about why the Miranda warnings and the Miranda
waiver form were not read to Defendant on the record and his consent similarly
captured on the record. Far too much of what may or may not have occurred was
left off the record and depended upon the officer’s recollection. There is no
excuse for such sloppy police practice in today’s world, particularly when it was
known that Defendant was coming from Mexico and in all probability spoke
little or no English. Proof of Defendant’s comprehension and waiver of his
Miranda rights should have been visible, and audible, from a clear record

423. The Davis Court noted that the case actually involved the extension of Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections to the military as a matter of Presidential order, and that it had never construed these constitutional
protections to the military directly. Id. at 457 n.*. However, because the Court of Military Appeals, had previously
held that the protections afforded by the amendments apply to a military proceeding, the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the amendments do apply to military proceedings because the parties had not contested the point.
Id.
424. State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 28, 22 P.3d 1177, 1185 (citation omitted).
425. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (“[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal
in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.…Rather, the suspect must
unambiguously request counsel.…Although a suspect need not ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,’
he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” (internal citations omitted)).
426. 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 28 n.1, 22 P.3d at 1184–85.
427. Id. ¶ 31, 22 P.3d at 1186.
428. E.g., State v. Bravo, 2006-NMCA-019, ¶ 17, 128 P.3d 1070, 1075. The Bravo court noted that in Davis,
512 U.S. at 460, the Supreme Court had recognized the possibility that where a suspect is fluent only in Spanish,
there was a danger that the purpose of Miranda warnings would be compromised by the language factor. Bravo,
2006-NMCA-019, ¶ 16, 128 P.3d at 1074–75.
429. 1999-NMCA-085, 984 P.2d 787.
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without subjecting Defendant, and this Court, to the vicissitudes of imperfect
memory, potentially colored by an overweening ambition to convict.430

Then-Judge Bosson did not find the record so inadequate as to justify dissent, but
his more general observations are particularly telling with regard to the potential for
development of state constitutional jurisprudence. For example, he virtually invited
counsel to argue that New Mexico law requires more protection for suspects than
the Supreme Court’s standard in Davis which is clearly deferential to law
enforcement, noting:
I agree with the opinion of the majority and its discussion of this case in light of
United States Supreme Court precedent which binds this Court with respect to
the federal constitution. It is unfortunate a better record was not made below on
which we could consider a different standard under our state constitution.431

Moreover, he advanced the analysis that defense counsel could argue at trial in
preserving the state constitutional claim for appellate review, observing: “Given the
linguistic and cultural differences our state enjoys, not to mention our border with
Mexico, our citizens should demand no less as part of intelligent, responsible law
enforcement.”432
In addition to the cultural differences noted in the concurrence that may warrant
broader constitutional protection for suspects interrogated in New Mexico than that
afforded under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, there is a potentially significant
difference in the language used in the state constitution that counsel advancing an
expansive state law argument should consider. The self-incrimination clauses of the
state and federal constitutions are roughly equivalent.433
However, article II, section 14 of the state constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend himself in person, and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have the charge
and testimony interpreted to him in a language that he understands; to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of necessary witnesses in his
behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed.434

The language of section 14 clearly recognizes the linguistic differences noted by
then-Judge Bosson as an express protection afforded by the New Mexico
Constitution. It would make little sense for this protection only to be afforded as a
matter of formal charging without the suspect being advised of the basis for his
arrest and interrogation in language he can understand.
Applying both the language of section 14 and the rationale advanced by the
concurrence in Castillo-Sanchez, a creative New Mexico defense lawyer should
430. Id. ¶ 35, 984 P.2d at 796, (Bosson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
431. Id. ¶ 34, 984 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
432. Id.
433. The New Mexico constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a
criminal proceeding.” N.M. CONST. art II, § 15. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent, comparable part: “No
person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
434. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14 (emphasis added).
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advance the argument that the state constitution affords greater protection for an
accused challenging his confession based on failure of the warnings to result in a
knowing waiver of rights. Of course, the argument must be predicated on a proper
factual foundation demonstrating the relevance of the language issue in order to
warrant a finding of reversible error, even though the appellate courts could always
recognize the existence of the broader state constitutional protection in a case in
which it did not actually apply the protection to afford a defendant relief.435
3. Confrontation and Cross-examination
The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington,436 re-opened the door
to the protection of the rights of an accused protected by the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause437 through primary reliance on cross-examination for testing
the credibility of out-of-court statements made by a witness not available to testify
at trial. Although the Court overruled prior decisions438 permitting admission of
uncrossed statements based upon “indicia of reliability” demonstrating their
trustworthiness,439 its rationale extends only to those statements that are
“testimonial” in nature:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at
issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. We leave for
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.440

Thus, Crawford does not ensure confrontation by cross-examination with respect
to all out-of-court statements or hearsay that the prosecution may offer at trial.
Nevertheless, Crawford has served to generate additional reconsideration of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation protection in contexts other than admission of
accomplice confessions, the context in which Crawford’s claim arose. For instance,
in Davis v. Washington and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana,441 the Court
435. For instance, a court may find that error has been waived by a failure to object. In State v. Jones, 88
N.M. 110, 112, 537 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ct. App. 1975), the court held that the trial court had given the jury an
instruction on the recent unexplained possession presumption that effectively provided that the presumption was
mandatory, in violation of constitutional precedent rejecting mandatory presumptions in criminal cases. However,
because the defendant failed to object and the appellate court declined to hold the error fundamentally defective,
it essentially announced a new rule without affording the defendant its benefit due to the failure to preserve error.
Id. at 114, 537 P.2d at 1010.
436. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
437. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
438. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
439. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
440. Id. at 68.
441. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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considered whether a 911 emergency call to police is admissible if the complainant
is unavailable to testify at trial. When the call itself simply reports the emergency,
the Court held that it is not “testimonial” in nature, simply being a call for help,
whereas, in Hammon, the statement was designed to provide police with
information about the offense, reflecting the kind of questioning that is
“testimonial.”442
Similarly, the admissibility of results of scientific tests without an opportunity
for the defense to cross-examine the expert or technician conducting the test has
generated conflicting lower court decisions.443 The New Mexico courts have, thus
far, held that cross-examination of the technician or expert who actually conducted
the test in issue, is not constitutionally required.444 However, the more recent case,
State v. Bullcoming, is now before the state supreme court on grant of certiorari, and
will almost certainly be resolved in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s
disposition of the issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.445 Although there is a
significant factual distinction between the New Mexico decisions, in which no
cross-examination violation was found where the State offered drug test results
through an expert witness subject to cross-examination at trial, and Melendez-Diaz,
where the prosecution merely introduced the verified results of the tests without a
sponsoring witness or the technician who had conducted the tests,446 the majority
opinion in Melendez-Diaz apparently forecloses reliance on affidavits in lieu of the
live testimony of analysts who actually performed the scientific test involved.447
This distinction could arguably serve to distinguish the position eventually taken by
the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz from the context in which cross-examination
claims have been asserted in the New Mexico cases, State v. Dedman and
Bullcoming. However, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on cross-examination of the
analyst who actually conducted the scientific test suggests that even live testimony
442. Id. at 829 (“It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation
into possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged.…”).
443. Compare, State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a report containing laboratory
test analysis was “testimonial” and inadmissible without opportunity to cross-examine the analyst), with People
v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007) (holding that a report of DNA test results was not “testimonial”), and
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) (holding that certificate of lab analysis identifying nature
and quantity of substance was not “testimonial”), abrogated by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009), and United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that autopsy report was a “business
record,” not “testimonial”). See also Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006) (distinguishing between statements
of “fact” and statements of “opinion” in autopsy reports, and holding that the latter are testimonial but the former
are not).
In United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 524 (2008), the
Eleventh Circuit rejected a Crawford challenge to the admission of a recording made by a cockpit voice recorder
in an aircraft, holding that the testimonial hearsay framework of Crawford applies only to the live testimony of
humans, and not to evidence reproduced mechanically. Id. at 1262–63.
444. State v. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, 102 P.3d 628; State v. Bullcoming, 2008-NMCA-097, 189 P.3d
679.
445. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
446. See Melendez-Diaz v. Commonwealth, 870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table
decision), available at 2007 WL 2189152, at *4 n.3.
447. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (“In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts’ affidavits
were testimonial statements, and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them, petitioner was entitled to ‘be confronted with’ the analysts at trial.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
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of another expert based on reported examination results will not meet the Court’s
demand for strict application of the Sixth Amendment confrontation guarantee.448
Further, in Giles v. California,449 the Court applied its renewed interest in
evaluating the expansion of the confrontation concept again in overruling the longstanding precedent of Reynolds v. United States,450 that held that where the
defendant had procured the absence of the witness and, therefore, was responsible
for his unavailability, the Sixth Amendment did not bar admission of the witness’s
statement despite the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination by the defense.
The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized and applied Crawford in State v.
Johnson,451 which was pending on direct appeal when the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Crawford.452 Moreover, the court applied Crawford
retroactively to afford relief to the state habeas petitioner, Earnest, in State v.
Forbes,453 based on its conclusion that Earnest properly relied on his right to crossexamine his purported accomplice who had confessed to police in an effort to
negotiate favorable treatment following their arrest. The history of the litigation is
somewhat complex. The court initially reversed Earnest’s conviction,454 relying on
Douglas v. Alabama.455
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Ohio v. Roberts, Douglas required the
testing of accomplice statements by cross-examination at trial as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation guarantee.456 Subsequently, the Court adopted the
“indicia of reliability” test in Ohio v. Roberts to permit admission of statements not
subjected to testing by cross-examination when the statements were deemed
sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted without affording the accused an opportunity
to engage in cross-examination. The reliability requirement, according to Ohio v.
Roberts, is met when the statement falls within a “firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule” traditionally recognized as justifying admission, or the statement has
“particular guarantees of trustworthiness.”457 The Court extended the “indicia of
reliability” test articulated in Roberts to include jointly inculpatory statements made
by accomplices to police in Lee v. Illinois,458 Ironically, the Lee majority did not
find that the accomplice’s statement was properly admitted and Lee was afforded
relief from the conviction.459
Shortly after issuing its decision in Lee, the Supreme Court vacated the reversal
ordered by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Earnest (Earnest I)460 and

448. Id.
449. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
450. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
451. 2004-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 2, 7, 98 P.3d 998, 1001–02.
452. Id. ¶ 2, 98 P.3d at 1001–02.
453. 2005-NMSC-027, 119 P.3d 144, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007). For an in-depth discussion of the
Forbes decision in light of the lengthy litigation in the Earnest case, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Crawford,
Retroactivity and The Importance of Being Earnest, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 231 (2008).
454. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 103 N.M. 95, 99, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (1985).
455. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
456. Id. at 418–20.
457. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
458. 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986).
459. Id. at 545.
460. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 103 N.M. 95, 99, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (1985).
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remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Lee.461 Although the
Supreme Court had itself never overruled Douglas,462 as the Crawford Court
noted,463 then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices
Powell and O’Connor, argued that Lee overruled Douglas v. Alabama by
implication in adopting the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts. 464
On remand from the order vacating its judgment for reconsideration in light of
Lee v. Illinois, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Earnest’s convictions.465
In so doing, it followed Justice Rehnquist’s lead and concluded that the
accomplice’s statement to the police demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability
to warrant admission despite his unavailability for cross-examination.466 The
primary basis for its decision was its characterization of the accomplice’s statement
as a declaration against his penal interest467 because it exposed him to prosecution
for a capital crime and potential death sentence.468 The court had consistently held
that the penal interest exception constituted a “firmly rooted” exception to the
hearsay rule following its decision affirming Earnest’s conviction on remand from
the United States Supreme Court.469 It persisted in this view even after the four
Justice plurality in Lilly v. Virginia470 concluded that the penal interest exception
was not “firmly rooted” for purposes of federal confrontation analysis.471
The decision in Crawford effectively reversed the state court’s position, at least
with regard to admissibility of testimonial hearsay statements of accomplices that
had previously been admitted without cross-examination based on application of the
penal interest exception. Consequently, once the Crawford Court rejected the
alternative rationale for admission of hearsay advanced in Ohio v. Roberts,472 the
New Mexico Supreme Court seized on the decision to afford relief to Earnest,473
461. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
462. Id. at 649.
463. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).
464. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
465. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539 (1987).
466. Id. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
467. Curiously, the court never addressed the text or applicability of the state’s evidence rule governing
admission of declarations against penal interest:
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary
to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another that a
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Rule 11-804(B)(3) NMRA.
468. Earnest II, 106 N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
469. State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 11, 971 P.2d 1267, 1280. The court held in Torres that statements
against penal interest function as per se exceptions to the general confrontation requirements because such
statements are firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule and therefore bear “adequate indicia of reliability.” Id.
¶¶ 29–32, 971 P.2d at 1278–80; accord State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 33 P.3d 267; State v.
Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 419, 421.
470. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
471. Id. at 127–34. The plurality concluded: “The decisive fact, which we make explicit today, is that
accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 134 n.5.
472. 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
473. State v. Forbes, 2005-NMSC-027, ¶ 13, 119 P.3d 144, 148–49.
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whose reliance on Douglas was reflected both in trial counsel’s preservation of
error by proper objection474 and the court’s reliance on Douglas to initially reverse
Earnest’s conviction.475
The posture of the state supreme court in State v. Forbes may offer opportunities
for expanding cross-examination as a necessary trial protection beyond testimonial
statements in New Mexico prosecutions.476 The reason is that confrontation had
traditionally been characterized as the right of cross-examination in decisions
construing the state constitutional protection. Arguably, the court’s reaffirmation
of pre-Roberts Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in Forbes—its reference to the
revitalization of Douglas, the basis for its initial reversal of Earnest’s
conviction—would logically provide a basis for reviewing the court’s treatment of
the state constitutional guarantee in article 2, section 14. That section provides, in
pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend himself in person, and by counsel; to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him.…”477
While the language of article II, section 14 does not differ at all from the
comparable definition of the confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, the
New Mexico courts had traditionally interpreted the guarantee more restrictively in
terms of ensuring that the right embraces the opportunity for cross-examination.
This is not to suggest that testimony or evidence not subject to cross-examination
had always been excluded, of course, because traditional exceptions to the hearsay
rule had provided vehicles for admissibility despite the absence of crossexamination.478 However, the state courts had developed a clear appreciation for the
significance of the cross-examination right in the conduct of criminal trials.
In State v. James,479 the state supreme court described the confrontation
guarantee of the state constitution in the following terms:
The purposes of confrontation are to secure to the accused the rights of crossexamination; the right of the accused, the court and the jury to observe the
deportment and conduct of the witness while testifying; and the moral effect
produced upon the witness by requiring him to testify at trial.480

The James court’s characterization was consistent with prior decisions, tracing its
history to Territory v. Ayer,481 where the court held that previously cross-examined
testimony was admissible where the witness was not available at trial because the

474. Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 119 P.3d at 147.
475. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 103 N.M. 95, 99, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (1985).
476. However, the court was very clear to point out that it was only affording relief to Earnest and not
applying a general rule providing retroactive effect to Crawford claims not directly at issue in Forbes. Forbes,
2005-NMSC-027, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d at 149.
477. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14.
478. See, e.g., State v. Quintana, 98 N.M. 17, 644 P.2d 531 (1982) (dying declaration); State v. Robinson,
94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980) (excited utterance); State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976) (coconspirator declaration).
479. 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966).
480. Id. at 380, 415 P.2d at 352 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965)).
481. 15 N.M. 581, 113 P. 604 (N.M. Terr. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, Ayer v. Territory, 201 F. 497 (8th
Cir. 1912).
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accused had been afforded an opportunity to cross and had done so.482 The court
consistently held that an opportunity for cross-examination was the lynchpin for
admissibility determinations in subsequent decisions applying article II, section
14.483 For instance, in State v. Martin,484 the court explained: “[O]ur constitution
provides that a defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, and this means that he not only has the right to look upon such witnesses, but
to cross examine them.”485
The court of appeals has followed the supreme court’s lead, affirming that crossexamination is an essential element in the state constitutional confrontation
guarantee in State v. Holly486 and subsequent decisions.487 In Valles v. State,488
moreover, the court noted that federal decisions construing comparable federal
constitutional guarantees are instructive in providing guidance for state
constitutional construction, but did not hold that either the federal decision was
controlling, or that the parameters of the right defined by federal decisions
necessarily would bind state interpretation.489
New Mexico courts have developed state constitutional law governing the right,
affirming the cross-examination requirement, while explaining when the protection
had been afforded despite the inability to cross a witness at trial.490 For example, in
State v. Duran,491 the court held that a prior decision to decline to engage in crossexamination, when available, did not deny confrontation because the opportunity
was available and the right to engage in cross-examination may be waived, as may
other rights secured by the constitution.492 And, in State v. Martinez,493 the court
construed the guarantee as fulfilled when counsel was available at the prior
proceeding and had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.494 Moreover, the
Martinez court observed that the construction of the constitutional guarantee is
controlled by the understanding of the right at the time of the adoption of the
482. Ayer, 15 N.M. at 585, 113 P. at 605. Justice Mechem’s opinion was consistent with the decision in
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), where the Supreme Court held that the prior testimony of a witness
could be admitted at trial when his unavailability was due to death and he had been cross-examined in the prior
proceeding.
483. State v. Jackson, 30 N.M. 309, 317, 233 P. 49, 52 (1924).
484. 53 N.M. 413, 209 P.2d 525 (1949).
485. Id. at 417, 209 P.2d at 527 (emphasis added).
486. 79 N.M. 516, 518, 445 P.2d 393, 395 (Ct. App. 1968).
487. See State v. Sparks, 85 N.M. 429, 430, 512 P.2d 1265, 1266 (Ct. App. 1973).
488. 90 N.M. 347, 563 P.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1977).
489. Id. at 349–50, 563 P.2d at 612–13.
490. For example, the court reversed based on an improper limitation on cross-examination by the trial court
in Sanchez v. State, 103 N.M. 25, 27, 702 P.2d 345, 347 (1985). Where the witness was available for crossexamination at trial, the court held that statements of the witness otherwise excludable as hearsay would not
demonstrate error under the state constitution confrontation protection. State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 353, 356, 658
P.2d 428, 431 (1983) (distinguishing between confrontation and effect of cross-examination in permitting jurors
to observe and assess demeanor of witness and concluding that latter is not part of the confrontation guarantee
under state constitution); State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 146, 584 P.2d 182, 193 (Ct. App. 1978).
491. 91 N.M. 756, 581 P.2d 19 (1978).
492. Id. at 758, 581 P.2d at 21 (finding no confrontation violation where defense counsel elected not to crossexamine witnesses who identified defendant from photograph and prosecutor subsequently elicited testimony from
officer concerning their identification).
493. 95 N.M. 445, 448, 623 P.2d 565, 568 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Fuson v. State, 105 N.M.
632, 735 P.2d 1138 (1987).
494. Id. at 448, 623 P.2d at 568.
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constitution,495 and expressly relied on Douglas v. Alabama in its interpretation of
the meaning of the right, while relying on the state constitution in deciding the
case.496
The history of confrontation analysis under article II, section 14 demonstrates a
consistent state constitutional requirement for cross-examination and preference for
in-court examination from Territorial days until the court’s departure from this
doctrine in affirming Earnest’s conviction on remand from the United States
Supreme Court in 1987.497 While Earnest asserted his state constitutional claim in
his original brief, and developed the argument fully on remand,498 the state supreme
court did not address the state constitutional theory in affirming his conviction.499
Similarly, he re-asserted the state constitutional claim again in his first application
for state post-conviction relief500 and, again, as an alternative basis for relief in his
second application, following Crawford.501
The supreme court’s retroactive application of Crawford to afford Earnest relief
suggests the court’s independent thinking that may now afford defendants renewed
interest in the cross-examination protection traditionally afforded under article II,
section 14. The court’s holding in Forbes, moreover, has now been reinforced by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Danforth v. Minnesota502 holding that state courts
are free to afford retroactive application of its decisions announcing new rules of
federal constitutional criminal procedure, regardless of the Court’s own
determination that the rules do not warrant mandatory retroactive application as a
matter of federal due process.503 The state court’s approach in Forbes, and its
continuing interest in the development of state constitutional law, may afford even
greater latitude in arguing for broader protection of the confrontation right in state
court trials, whether flowing from the state constitutional protection or retroactive
application.
One obvious possibility is to challenge admission of hearsay statements
purportedly made by declarants whose credibility may be suspect. Two specific
circumstances suggest the particular value of cross-examination. The first involves
co-conspirator declarations which are, of course, typically excluded from the
definition of hearsay even though they are clearly out-of-court statements.504 They

495. Id.
496. Id.
497. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 106 N.M. 411, 412, 744 P.2d 539, 540 (1987).
498. Brief for the Defendant/Appellant on Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States at 2–7,
Earnest II, 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539 (No. 15,162).
499. Earnest II, 106 N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540. In the brief on remand, the author argued vigorously that
the state court should consider Earnest’s reliance on the New Mexico constitutional confrontation protection as an
alternative basis for review. Regardless of what the court may have thought about the quality of briefing, it did not
discuss the state constitutional analog to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in affirming the conviction.
500. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54-W (N.M. 5th. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug.
29, 1990).
501. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54-W (N.M. 5th. Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct.
1, 2004).
502. 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008).
503. For a more thorough discussion of Danforth and its significance, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Danforth,
Retroactivity and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425 (2008).
504. For instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against
a party and is “a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
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are admissible because the statements of co-conspirators, arguably in furtherance
of the conspiracy, are presumably reliable.505 But they are made by individuals
involved in criminal activity, by definition,506 whose interests may not always
reflect an unsophisticated approach to the information they may be conveying in
their statements. In United States v Inadi, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that cross-examination would afford a substantial test of the reliability of the out-ofcourt declarations:
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will
reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during
the course of the conspiracy.
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have changed
substantially between the time of the statements and the trial. The declarant and
the defendant will have changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to
suspects or defendants in a criminal trial, each with information potentially
damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be facing indictment or trial,
in which case he has little incentive to aid the prosecution, and yet will be
equally wary of coming to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that
situation, it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the
evidentiary significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operating
in full force.507

This analysis, however, disregards the obvious potential for cross-examination to
permit jurors to assess the credibility of the out-of-court statement in terms of the
declarant’s demeanor in court, or his motives to implicate the accused in the
conspiracy. When the prosecution intends to use the co-conspirator as a witness at
trial and negotiates an agreement or seeks a grant of immunity to compel the
testimony, the out-of-court declaration is unnecessary and jurors may make the
credibility assessment that they routinely do with regard to the testimony of every
live witness.
However, when the prosecution relies on co-conspirator declarations made to a
non-compromised witness, such as an undercover officer or informant privy to the
conspiracy, jurors must rely on the prosecution’s witness in assessing whether the
co-conspirator declaration was accurately reported by the witness or even, in fact,
ever made. Moreover, there is no opportunity for the defense to test the intent of the
declarant because the testifying witness would likely not be able to offer speculation
about what the declarant intended when incriminating the defendant, or whether he
was truthful in terms of the actual contents of the statement. Just as testimonial
statements of accomplices—made after police are aware of the accomplice’s
involvement—are treated as inherently suspect in the Supreme Court’s
confrontation jurisprudence,508 co-conspirator declarations are admissible precisely
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
505. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (holding that co-conspirator declarations are admissible
without showing of unavailability).
506. Id. (“Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their illegal
aims than when testifying on the witness stand.”).
507. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
508. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting) (such statements “have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion”); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
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because it is assumed that they are made in furtherance of the conspiracy and are,
therefore, reliable. But this assumption is undeniably naïve or cynical, given the
admittedly criminal character of the declarant.
The Inadi Court may be correct in concluding that in-court testimony is likely to
lose much of the import of the out-of-court declaration. But that difference inures
to the benefit of the prosecutor offering the statement without having to produce the
declarant to be tested under oath. Given the strong preference for cross-examination
in prior New Mexico decisions, it is arguable that admission of co-conspirator
declarations based on their presumed reliability should be reconsidered.
The same problem is posed by admission of non-testimonial declarations against
penal interest, admitted without the opportunity for cross-examination, based on
their presumed reliability. Clearly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has persisted
in holding that this exception to the usual exclusion for hearsay satisfies the
requirement for a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under state law, even
though the Supreme Court in Lilly basically rejected this position.509 As with coconspirator declarations, the character of the declarant, who by definition admits his
own involvement in criminal activity, should caution against the naïve or cynical
assumption that the statement will always be reliable and not the product of the
declarant’s interest in implicating others in the criminal activity whether they were
actually involved or not.
The answer to the problems posed by admitting co-conspirator declarations and
non-testimonial declarations against penal interest and the problems of assessing the
accuracy of any incriminating allegation and the general credibility of the declarant
and testifying witness may be addressed by considering the availability of the
declarant. Under either theory of admissibility, the declarant is unlikely to be
available to be called by the defense because of his ability to assert his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.510 The co-conspirator declaration theory avoids
this concern by making unavailability irrelevant to the admissibility determination,
while statements offered as declarations against penal interest do require a showing
of unavailability.511 Of course, if the prosecutor negotiates for the declarant’s
testimony at trial, or if the declarant is forced to testify under a grant of immunity
sought by the prosecution, the declarant will be subjected to cross-examination and
any confrontation concern arising from the lack of cross-examination will be
obviated.
The simple way to ensure that the cross-examination option remains available to
the defense, even upon admission of out-of-court declarations, is to recognize a
right of the defendant to force the prosecution to produce the declarant and make
him available by seeking an immunity order from the trial court.512 New Mexico
530, 541 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (such statements are “inevitably suspect”).
509. See State v. Desnoyers, 2002-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 8–10, 55 P.3d 968, 974–75; State v. Martinez-Rodriguez,
2001-NMSC-029, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d 267, 278 (“We are unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument and reaffirm that, in
New Mexico, a statement against penal interest within the meaning of Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule.”); State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 36, 989 P.2d 419, 427 (rejecting Lilly
plurality’s discrediting of penal interest exception as “firmly rooted”).
510. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
511. Rule 11-804(B)(3) NMRA.
512. A prosecutor interested in forcing a reluctant witness to testify may move the trial court for an order
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courts have had occasion to consider whether circumstances will warrant a judicial
expansion of the immunity option that is almost always limited to the prosecution.513
The New Mexico courts had consistently rejected arguments that due process
requires recognition of a right for defendants to seek compelled immunity orders
from the trial court,514 except when the prosecution has engaged in deliberate
misconduct,515 until the supreme court’s recent and rather dramatic reversal of its
position in State v. Belanger.516
In Belanger, the court reassessed its prior rejection of court-ordered immunity
based on a defense request in an extensive and well-reasoned opinion in which the
court explained in depth the controlling, but not exclusive, authority of the state
courts in matters of judicial procedure.517 In terms of the power to order immunity
over the objections of a witness asserting his right to remain silent, the court noted
that in New Mexico law, the authority to order the witness to testify was grounded
in judicial rule-making, while on the federal level, the authority is provided to the
courts by Congress.518
Most courts, like the New Mexico courts prior to Belanger, that have considered
the option of authorizing the trial court to immunize a witness whose testimony may
be critical to the defense have been extremely reluctant to recognize any such
right.519 The significant exception had always been the Third Circuit, which
recognized that in some cases the defense should be entitled to compel the
prosecution to seek an immunity order to force a witness to testify who would
otherwise refuse.520 But without the option, defendants are placed in an inherently
unfair position in many trials. The State has almost unlimited power to coerce a
witness through the immunity process, quite apart from the other positive incentives
that are available to induce reluctant witnesses to testify. When it relies on
uncrossed out-of-court statements under either the co-conspirator or penal interest
granting use immunity for the witness’s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 286–87, 681 P.2d
708, 712–13 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, 210 P.3d 783 (holding
that under New Mexico and federal law, prosecutor is afforded the option of seeking immunity order for reluctant
witness claiming privilege against self-incrimination). Once immunity is conferred in response to assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which initially insulates a potential defendant from being
forced to testify when their truthful testimony may serve to inculpate them, the trial court is empowered to order
the immunized witness to testify. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Once the witness testifies under
immunity order, the burden is placed on the prosecution to prove that it did not use the immunized testimony or
any evidence derived from the immunized testimony as a basis for then prosecuting the witness. United States v.
North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Failure to comply may result in contempt proceedings. NMSA 1978, § 31-615(A) (1979); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
513. E.g., State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-045, 946 P.2d 1066; Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708; State v.
Sanchez, 98 N.M. 428, 649 P.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled by Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, 210 P.3d 783.
514. See State v. Belanger, 2007-NMCA-143, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d at 531, rev’d, 2009-NMSC-025, 210 P.3d 783.
515. See Sanchez, 98 N.M. at 432–33, 649 P.2d at 500–01 (holding that absent a showing of prosecutorial
misconduct, the “courts have no power to independently fashion witness use immunity under the guise of due
process”).
516. 2009-NMSC-025, 210 P.3d 783.
517. Id. ¶¶ 31–35, 210 P.3d at 790–92.
518. Id. ¶¶ 22–30, 35, 210 P.3d at 789–91, 792.
519. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 381–82
(N.Y. 1981). In Autry v. McKaskle, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984), the Court denied certiorari in a death penalty case in
which one issue raised was the defendant’s need to have a witness testify under grant of immunity. Justice Marshall
dissented, noting a conflict between the circuits on this issue.
520. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1980).
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theories, the defense is handicapped in its ability to at least attempt to test the
reliability of the statement or declarant, or both, through cross-examination before
the jury.
Belanger not only strengthens the Confrontation right, it arguably does so in two
different ways. First, it affords the defense a powerful, although not unlimited tool,
for presenting evidence that also implicates compulsory process protection because
it affords the defendant the option for requiring testimony from reluctant witnesses.
And second, it suggests that the prosecution must use the immunity power to
present hearsay declarants whose statements may be non-custodial and, thus, not
subject to the direct command of Crawford, for live testimony subject to crossexamination. Because this live testimony is most likely to be presented before the
trial jury, it enhances the traditional protection afforded by face-to-face
confrontation at trial.
In Coy v. Iowa,521 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in reiterating the
constitutional preference for face-to-face confrontation between the accused and
witnesses against him in the presence of the jury: “We have never doubted,
therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”522 Even the Roberts
Court conceded the constitutional preference for face-to-face confrontation.523
Given the power of cross-examination to afford jurors the ability to accurately
assess the evidence the prosecution offers in support of the defendant’s conviction,
New Mexico lawyers should consider arguing for a reassessment of the state
constitution’s confrontation protection afforded by article II, section 14 in light of
the state’s traditional jurisprudence equating confrontation with cross-examination.
4. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Although the New Mexico courts have yet to apply similar analysis to the
effective assistance of counsel guarantee included in the state constitution,524 the
supreme court left open the question of whether a New Mexico defendant might be
entitled to greater protection than under the Sixth Amendment525 counterpart in
Patterson v. LeMaster.526 New Mexico courts have consistently used the Supreme
Court’s Sixth Amendment test for counsel’s effectiveness set out in Strickland v.
521. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
522. Id. at 1016. Coy would appear to repudiate, by implication, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s rationale
in State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 353, 356, 658 P.2d 428, 431 (1983), in holding that the jury’s opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the testifying witness is not part of the confrontation guarantee.
523. “The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial.…” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157
(1970) (“[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”)).
524. The New Mexico Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend himself in person, and by counsel.…” N.M. CONST. art II, § 14.
525. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right…to have Assistance of counsel for his defence.” In State v. Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-061, 951 P.2d 605,
the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the New Mexico Constitution affords broader protection for the
right to counsel than that provided by the Sixth Amendment. Id. ¶ 22, 951 P.2d at 611 (“[W]e conclude that we
have no basis for expanding the protection provided by the New Mexico Constitution beyond that provided, on
these facts, by the federal constitution.”).
526. 2001-NMSC-013, 21 P.3d 1032.
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Washington,527 which requires proof that counsel performed defectively and that as
a consequence, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for
counsel’s defective performance.528
Since New Mexico courts have applied the Strickland test to a wide range of
claims of defective performance,529 one might question why greater protection
should be recognized for the performance of counsel than that afforded by
Strickland, which has been extended to cover claims of defective performance
arising during sentencing530 and on appeal.531 But, in fact, state courts,532 including
New Mexico courts, have already been enforcing a more rigorous test for
performance of counsel in select situations than that recognized, at this point, as
part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.
For example, in State v. Paredez,533 the state supreme court found that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise a defendant that he would almost
certainly be deported when he entered a particular plea, and as a result the
defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea as being involuntary and
unknowing.534 The court noted that no federal court to have considered this question
had concluded that counsel’s effectiveness in representation would be undermined
by failure to advise a client of immigration consequences of a conviction obtained
on plea of guilty.535 The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in Padilla v.
Kentucky to consider the same issue as a matter of Sixth Amendment effective
assistance.536
Similarly, in State v. Edwards,537 a sex crimes case, the court of appeals held that
defense counsel’s performance was deficient where he failed to advise the
defendant that a plea of guilty or no contest would result in mandatory registration

527. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
528. See State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020, ¶ 9, 979 P.2d 729, 731; State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-045, ¶ 20,
946 P.2d 1066, 1070–71; State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 229–30, 824 P.2d 1023, 1031–32 (1992).
529. For instance, in Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344, 349, 851 P.2d 466, 471 (1993), the court held that
counsel’s failure to develop and give notice of an alibi defense and call supporting witnesses constituted ineffective
assistance. Similarly, in State v. Crislip the court held that a failure to investigate and call a key witness constituted
defective performance. 109 N.M. 351, 357, 785 P.2d 262, 268 (Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by
Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 215–20, 849 P.2d 358, 358–63 (1993).
530. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
531. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285–88 (2000).
532. See, e.g., People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 113–14 (N.Y. 2000) (rejecting Strickland standard in favor
of “meaningful representation” standard).
533. 2004-NMSC-036, 101 P.3d 799. For in depth analysis of Paredez, see Tyler Atkins, Note, Immigration
Consequences of Guilty Pleas: What State v. Paredez Means to New Mexico Criminal Defendants and Defense
Attorneys, 36 N.M. L. REV. 603 (2006).
534. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 12–16, 101 P.3d at 803–04.
535. Id. ¶ 9, 101 P.3d at 803. The court noted:
Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuits have held that the trial court must inform
defendants of all possible consequences flowing from a guilty plea. The trial court only has a
duty to ensure that the defendant understands the “direct” consequences of the plea but is under
no duty to advise the defendant of the plea’s “collateral” consequences.
Id. (citing United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The court also noted, “Each federal circuit
that has directly considered the issue has held that deportation is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty so that
the trial court is not required to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her plea.” Id.
(citations omitted).
536. 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
537. 2007-NMCA-043, 157 P.3d 56.
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as a sex offender538 under the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act.539 Paredez and Edwards demonstrate the more aggressive posture
taken by the state courts with respect to defining the parameters of effective
representation in terms of counsel’s duties to ensure that the client’s plea of guilty
is knowingly and intelligently made. However, both decisions rest on Sixth
Amendment, rather than New Mexico constitutional protection afforded by article
II, section 14.540
The argument should be advanced, however, that New Mexico defense counsel
can only represent their clients effectively if they are properly informed and use
claims recognized under state law. Thus, the very existence of a body of New
Mexico constitutional law creates an expectation that counsel will utilize the
existing body of law to protect the client’s rights. Moreover, in light of the interest
of New Mexico courts in the continuing development of state constitutional law,
counsel should comply with the procedure established in Gomez and other state
constitutional law decisions in raising and arguing novel claims asserting more
favorable protection for their clients under the state constitution than that otherwise
afforded by federal constitutional protections. While failure to do so may not
necessarily result in deficient performance or incompetence, New Mexico state
constitutional law decisions suggest a dual responsibility: defense counsel should
make creative legal arguments based on the state constitution and ensure that they
are properly preserved for appellate review.
Arguably, counsel’s failure to argue both may not demonstrate Sixth Amendment
violations in terms of defective performance because they do not arise from failure
to assert claims protected by the Federal Constitution.541 This is almost certainly the
case with regard to a duty to raise new issues, even if a failure to rely on existing
state constitutional law does implicate the Sixth Amendment protection.542 Further,
appellate counsel might be expected to assert claims of fundamental error for claims

538. Id. ¶ 31, 157 P.3d at 64–65 (distinguishing, by implication, State v. Moore, 2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 24,
86 P.3d 635, 643 (holding that a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary or unknowing simply because trial court
did not admonish defendant that mandatory registration as sex offender would be required upon conviction)).
539. NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-4(A), (C) (2005).
540. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 13–16, 19–20, 101 P.3d at 804, 805; Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶¶
20–21, 157 P.3d at 62.
541. For instance, the second circuit has addressed the question of whether the Sixth Amendment effective
assistance guarantee encompasses the duty to assert state law claims arising from more expansive interpretation
of state constitutional protections. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2001) (petitioner may
claim ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on counsel’s failure to raise state law claim on appeal);
Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The claim whose omission forms the basis of an ineffective
assistance claim may be either a federal-law or a state-law claim.”); Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 803 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1992) (“The federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel may be violated by an attorney’s
failure to raise a meritorious state law claim or defense.”).
542. By analogy, in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986), the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment effective assistance guarantee included the duty to litigate constitutional claims that would otherwise
not be cognizable in a federal habeas action. Thus, counsel’s failure to appeal the state trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion permitted the Fourth Amendment issue to be evaluated on habeas review, even though a direct
Fourth Amendment suppression claim relating to the seizure would have been barred under Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 378. The seventh circuit employed similar reasoning in Holman v. Page,
95 F.3d 481, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1996).
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not preserved by trial counsel, at least for those fundamental errors previously
identified in the opinions of the New Mexico appellate courts.543
5. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In State v. Rueda,544 the defendant argued that the enhanced sentence she suffered
as a habitual criminal violated federal545 and state constitutional protections546
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Rueda’s punishment was
enhanced to eight years as a result of her multiple convictions for shoplifting, at
least one of which was over fifteen years old.547 Although habitual sentencing had
been upheld by the state supreme court,548 the Rueda court noted that “not every
sentence will withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is found to contravene rights
guaranteed under either the federal or state constitution.”549 However, the court
rejected Rueda’s argument based on her five felony-shoplifting convictions.550
What is particularly important in Rueda is that the court also rejected the State’s
argument that it was barred from reviewing the challenge under the state
constitution. The court emphatically responded: “We reject the State’s assertion that
a defendant may not invoke a proportionality review under Article II, Section 13 of
the New Mexico State Constitution.”551 The court further rejected the State’s
argument that proportionality review was constitutionally precluded in non-capital
cases, examining the Supreme Court’s decisions in Solem v. Helm552 and Harmelin
v. Michigan,553 in concluding that even as a matter of Eighth Amendment
interpretation, proportionality review remained viable for consideration of noncapital sentencing schemes. Despite the fact that the Court overruled Solem in
Harmelin, rejecting its endorsement of broad proportionality review,554 the Rueda
court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s position in McGruder v. Puckett,555 where that
court concluded:
By applying a head-count analysis, we find that seven members of the Court
supported a continued Eighth Amendment guaranty against disproportional
sentences. Only four justices, however, supported the continued application of
all three factors in Solem, and five justices rejected it. Thus, this much is clear:
disproportionality survives; Solem does not. Only Justice Kennedy’s opinion
reflects that view. It is to his opinion, therefore, that we turn for direction.

543. See supra text accompanying notes 49–60.
544. 1999-NMCA-033, 975 P.2d 351.
545. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
546. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13. The entirety of the constitutional protection is this reference: “nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.” The court in Rueda recognized the identical wording of the state and federal
constitutional provisions with regard to this particular concern. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 8, 975 P.2d at 353.
547. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 16, 975 P.2d at 354.
548. State v. Davis, 104 N.M. 229, 230, 719 P.2d 807, 808 (1986).
549. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 10, 975 P.2d at 353.
550. Id. ¶ 16, 975 P.2d at 354.
551. Id. ¶ 13, 975 P.2d at 354.
552. 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
553. 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
554. Id. at 960–67.
555. 954 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Accordingly, we will initially make a threshold comparison of the gravity of [the
defendant’s] offenses against the severity of his sentence.556

Although recognizing that proportionality challenges will only rarely succeed, the
Rueda court also noted that prior challenges based on the cruel and unusual
punishment protection had been advanced in state litigation.557
Rueda was unsuccessful in challenging her own sentence,558 but the court’s
opinion serves to leave the door open to sentencing challenges under the state
constitution, precisely because it rejects the State’s argument that it is barred from
reviewing constitutional challenges to sentences imposed by the Legislature. In
addition, in Montoya v. Ulibarri, the court held that conviction and incarceration
of an innocent defendant violates the state constitutional prohibition of “cruel and
unusual punishment,”559 suggesting that the state constitution may provide an
additional basis for challenging convictions.
6. Jury Service, and Freedom of Religion
The New Mexico Constitution provides a much more detailed protection for
religious freedom than the rather brief reference in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.…”560 In contrast, article II, section 11 of the state constitution provides:
Every man shall be free to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and no person shall ever be molested or denied any civil or political
right or privilege on account of his religious opinion or mode of religious
worship. No person shall be required to attend any place of worship or support
any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any preference be given by law to
any religious denomination or mode of worship.561

The protection afforded the individual in matters of faith is far more comprehensive
than that literally expressed in the First Amendment and it may offer a very
important option for trial counsel in New Mexico cases based on the religious
preference of prospective jurors and the use of peremptory challenges.

556. Id. at 316. The Fifth Circuit then explained: “Only if we infer that the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the offense will we then consider the remaining factors of the Solem test and compare the
sentence received to (1) sentences for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime
in other jurisdictions.” Id.
557. State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶¶ 10–11, 14, 975 P.2d 351, 353–54. The court cited In re Ernesto
M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 22, 915 P.2d 318, 324 (reviewing whether sentencing child as adult pursuant to
youthful offender statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment), and State v. Arrington, 115 N.M. 559, 561,
855 P.2d 133, 135 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding a “mandatory sentence is still subject to constitutional scrutiny”). It
also noted that Arrington’s successful challenge was predicated on an allegation of inadequate medical care
available for the defendant in prison, rather than the punishment authorized by the Legislature and that,
subsequently, Arrington’s sentence had been upheld where the evidence showed that medical care was, in fact,
available at the state’s penitentiary for women. State v. Arrington, 120 N.M. 54, 897 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1995).
558. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 17, 975 P.2d at 355.
559. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 24, 163 P.3d 476, 484.
560. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
561. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
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The constitutional principle that deserves consideration involves the use of
peremptory challenges by the prosecution to exclude members of cognizable groups
from jury service. In Batson v. Kentucky,562 the Court reaffirmed the basic right of
citizens to participate in the civic event of jury service563 and, by extension,
recognized an implicit right of litigants not to be subjected to trial before juries
from which minority citizens had been excluded through discriminatory use of
peremptories.564 The Batson principle was extended to preclude discriminatory use
of peremptories against prospective jurors based on gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel T.B.565 The prohibition against discriminatory use of peremptories is now fully
protective of the rights of the criminal defendant566 and indeed, any party in
criminal567 or civil litigation.568
However, the Supreme Court has not extended the Batson principle to the
exercise of peremptories based upon the religious beliefs or affiliation of a
prospective juror, although the issue was placed directly before the Court in Davis
v. Minnesota,569 drawing a sharp dissent to the denial of certiorari from Justice
Thomas,570 joined by Justice Scalia. The issue of whether peremptories can be
directed at prospective jurors on the basis of religious belief or affiliation thus
remains unresolved as a matter of federal constitutional law.571
There are two provisions in the New Mexico Constitution that would appear to
preclude exercise of peremptory challenges based on the religious belief or
affiliation of a prospective juror. The relevant part of article II, section 11 provides:
“no person shall ever be molested or denied any civil or political right or privilege
on account of his religious opinion or mode of religious worship.”572 This language
562. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
563. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) the Court held that the statutory exclusion of
African Americans from jury service is unconstitutional. The discriminatory exclusion of minority jurors through
exercise of peremptory challenges was, similarly, held unconstitutional in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222–24
(1965).
564. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85–86; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that claim of discriminatory
use of peremptories to exclude black jurors may be made by white defendant in criminal trial).
565. 511 U.S. 127, 135, 137 n.6 (1994).
566. New Mexico took steps to provide more complete protection against discriminatory use of peremptories
than that afforded by the Supreme Court’s requirement in Swain. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
Under Swain, the defendant must have been able to demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory strikes by the
prosecutor in order to obtain relief. Batson supplanted the Swain standard for demonstrating discriminatory use
of peremptories by permitting the defendant to challenge the state’s use of peremptories in an individual trial.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93.
567. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to prohibit discriminatory use of
peremptory strikes by counsel for criminal defendant).
568. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to prohibit use of
premptories in a discriminatory manner by counsel in civil litigation).
569. 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
570. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that at trial the prosecutor had offered the explanation
for his exercise of the strike as based on his experience that “Jahovah Witness [sic] are reluctant to exercise
authority over their fellow human beings in this Court House.” Id. (citing Davis v. State, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768
(Minn. 1993)).
571. The Texas courts, for instance, have taken the position that the constitutional prohibition against
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges does not extend to strikes based on a juror’s religious beliefs. See
Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (op. on rehearing). The rationale is that religious belief
involves a personal decision and that the particular tenets of the religious belief adopted by the prospective juror
may afford counsel a rational basis for exercising a strike against that juror.
572. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
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clearly protects jury service as a component of citizenship and is reinforced by
another state constitutional provision, article VII, section 3, which provides, in
pertinent part: “[t]he right of any citizen of the [S]tate to…sit upon juries[] shall
never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of religion.…”573
In a capital prosecution, State v. Clark,574 the defendant argued that exclusion of
jurors based on religious opposition to the death penalty violated protection of
religious freedom afforded by the state constitution. The court concluded that jurors
who were excluded from service on the trial jury were disqualified not on the basis
of religion, but due to their inability “to view the proceedings impartially and
perform their duties in accordance with the juror’s oath, not because of their
religious opinion or affiliation.”575
The Clark court’s holding is consistent with federal constitutional policy
articulated in Witherspoon v. Illinois.576 Witherspoon, taken with the Court’s
rejection of the argument that exclusion of capital punishment opponents produces
conviction-prone juries in Lockhart v. McCree,577 certainly supports the court’s
position. The strict limitation imposed by Witherspoon, however, permits exclusion
of those jurors who cannot vote fairly on the evidence presented at either the
guilt/innocence or punishment phases of trial. It does not authorize exclusion of
prospective jurors who may have grave misgivings about capital punishment, but
who profess that they remain able to consider the evidence without predisposition
and can return a verdict based on the evidence presented, rather than skewing their
perceptions of the evidence to ensure that the death sentence will not be imposed.578
Repeal of the death penalty by the state legislature579 effectively moots
reconsideration of Clark, of course. However, the broader issue regarding use of
peremptory strikes to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of religious belief or
preference remains an unsettled question under both the United States and New
Mexico Constitutions.
CONCLUSIONS
The requirement of Rule 101 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, that a
lawyer should “provide competent representation,” has certain important state
constitutional law implications for New Mexico criminal lawyers. In order to
provide competent representation in New Mexico criminal proceedings, the
requirement that counsel act with “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary” imposes the duty to fully and accurately advise
the client about alternative litigation tactics and strategies and to protect the client’s
legal rights. This requirement also means that counsel must be familiar with New
573. Id. art. VIII, § 3.
574. 1999-NMSC-035, 990 P.2d 793.
575. Id. ¶ 16, 990 P.2d at 803.
576. 391 U.S. 510, 517–18 (1968).
577. 476 U.S. 162, 173–77 (1986).
578. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46–49 (1980) (holding that jurors opposed to capital punishment, but
capable of responding fairly and directly to punishment interrogatories used to determine punishment cannot be
disqualified under Witherspoon).
579. See Associated Press, “Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/us/19execute.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
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Mexico state constitutional precedent and the process for preserving and asserting
novel state law claims.
The ethical requirement that criminal defense counsel approach representation
with thoroughness and preparation suggests that counsel engage in a continual
learning process about the developing state constitutional law and then develop a
strategy for using state constitutional rights on behalf of the accused.
The burden on New Mexico criminal lawyers to understand and apply state
constitutional protections is made all the more important by the aggressive approach
taken by the state’s appellate courts in evaluating claims for constitutional
interpretation offering more expansive protections than those afforded by
comparable federal constitutional provisions. Because the courts have engaged in
significant interpretive activity and clearly indicated preservation requirements for
assertion of existing state constitutional rules and arguing for expansive
interpretations of other provisions, the obligation to use existing state constitutional
protections should clearly be viewed as part of the guarantee of effective assistance
under both the state and Federal Constitutions. Further, the history of the state
courts’ activism and delineation of proper approaches with regard to new claims or
new applications to analogous factual contexts virtually invites creative litigation
in the future. As the Vermont court reminds us, that creativity reflects the legal
imagination that will continue to constitute our finest jurisprudence.580

580. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 238 (Vt. 1985).

